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 Abstract 
On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional 
offensive, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam.  In response to this act President 
Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN) to resume bombing 
North Vietnam.  For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the 
whole of the DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives.  First, USAF units sought 
to interdict sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army’s (NVA’s) supply lines to preclude 
continued conventional operations in South Vietnam.  Second, President Nixon had directed the 
Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam in order to deter further aggression 
against its southern neighbor.  Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, USAF was to establish 
convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of an allied nation during a 
major conflict.  Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in December 1972, the Air Force 
was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part of American nuclear 
deterrence policy. 
Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained 
that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks.  However, the evidence strongly 
indicates that the United States Air Force not only failed to achieve all but the interdiction 
objective during the course of operations against North Vietnam, but that this defeat stemmed 
from the decision not to develop a comprehensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 
doctrine from 1968 through 1972.  In choosing this course of action, USAF’s military and 
civilian leaders guaranteed that American forces would be unable to bring sufficient force to bear 
to achieve President Nixon’s goals.  Furthermore, by choosing this course of action and, in 
addition, refocusing the Air Force on nuclear delivery rather than enhancing USAF’s capability 
to penetrate an integrated air defense (IADS), these same leaders ignored the results of Operation 
Rolling Thunder.  The consequence of this choice, as will be shown in the following pages, was 
an outcome that had serious implications for the United States’ Cold War conventional and 
nuclear military policy.
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CHAPTER 1 - A Very Unhappy Easter 
On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional 
assault, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam.  For the first time, the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) eschewed its traditional guerilla and light-infantry oriented tactics in 
favor of a mechanized, multi-divisional attack against the Republic of South Vietnam.  Dubbed 
the “Easter Offensive” by the Americans, the assault was intended to simultaneously shatter the 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), occupy South Vietnam’s regional capitals and, 
through these two events, destabilize the South Vietnamese government.1  In response to this act 
President Richard Nixon ordered United States Air Force and Navy to resume bombing North 
Vietnam.   
For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the whole of the  
DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives.  First, USAF sought to interdict 
sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army’s (NVA’s) supply lines to preclude continued 
conventional operations in South Vietnam.  Second, President Nixon had directed the Air Force 
to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam that the DRV Politburo was deterred from 
authorizing further aggression against South Vietnam.  Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, 
USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of 
an allied nation during a major conflict.2  Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in 
December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part 
of American nuclear deterrence policy. 
Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained 
that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks.  In the mind of many Air Force 
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officers and authors, USAF and USN aircraft pummeled the NVA spearhead in the field, 
shattered the North Vietnamese supply net during Operations Freedom Train and Linebacker I, 
then bludgeoned and dragged a recalcitrant North Vietnam back to the peace table via 
Linebacker II’s B-52 strikes.3  In many circles it has become an article of faith that, but for the 
interference of civilian leaders, what was accomplished in 1972 could have been achieved in 
1968 with the end result being an independent and viable South Vietnam.4   
This study will illustrate that the historical evidence does not support these theories.  In 
reality, the United States Air Force only achieved its interdiction objective, and this due 
primarily to the tactical application of air power in South Vietnam.  During the course of 1972 
operations against Vietnam (heretofore referred to as Linebacker Operations), the Air Force was 
unable to demonstrate convincing conventional capability, punish the North Vietnamese to deter 
future attacks against South Vietnam, or demonstrate that its manned bombers were still viable 
weapons systems.  As with Operation Rolling Thunder, these shortcomings did not stem from 
civilian interference, but the Air Force’s decision not to develop a Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defense (SEAD) doctrine from 1968 through 1972.  The evidence presented in the following 
pages will clearly illustrate that the Air Force’s civilian and military leaders made decisions in 
this area which lead directly to USAF possessing obsolescent equipment and lacking operational 
guidance when operations resumed against North Vietnam in 1972.  As a result, by the end of 
Linebacker operations many observers questioned USAF’s ability to penetrate an integrated air 
defense system (IADS).  This outcome, in turn, had serious implications for the United States’ 
conventional and nuclear military policy for the remainder of the Cold War.5
Historical Placement 
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What constitutes the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses?  This question will have 
various answers depending on what service, nation, or reference the asker consults.  Edward 
Luttwak and Stuart Koehl’s The Dictionary of Modern War defined SEAD in 1991 as “a U.S. 
term for weapons, tactics, and operations whose aim is to destroy or otherwise neutralize anti-
aircraft guns and surface to air missiles in order to allow attack aircraft to operate more freely.”6  
This definition, however, was written by USAF and intended for that service’s use only.7  In the 
aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, which saw engagements of immobile SAM batteries by 
U.S. Army artillery and the opening salvo of the war fired by U.S. Army Apache attack 
helicopters, many military professionals agreed on the need for a broader definition.8  Although 
these officers were initially few in number, subsequent operations against Iraq and Serbia in the 
1990s reinforced the point that all of the services had a vested interest in SEAD.  Thus, in June 
2004 the Department of Defense modified the definition to include “that activity that neutralizes, 
destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based air defense by destructive or disruptive means.”9  
Although at first reading this may appear to be a small change in wording, in military terms the 
second definition greatly expanded the number of systems, activities, and operations that could 
be included in SEAD operations.   
In general, what historiography is available has followed the thrust of Luttwak and 
Koehl’s definition when examining the history of SEAD.  For example, Anthony Thornborough 
and Frank Mormillo’s Iron Hand: Smashing the Enemy’s Air Defenses focuses on attacks against 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) and gun sites during Vietnam while excluding any information on 
efforts to destroy the NVAF’s interceptors.10  Likewise, books which focus on aerial combat 
(e.g., Ivan Rendall’s Rolling Thunder) ignore the often potent effect that ground-based defenses 
had on the tactics employed by both sides of the conflict.11  Only a handful of works give a 
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comprehensive view (i.e., one that encompasses all aspects of the struggle) of aerial combat over 
North Vietnam and the majority of these do not focus on the role that the Air Force’s doctrinal 
evolution played in its eventual defeat.12   
This paper will break from this established historiography in several ways.  First, this 
paper will define SEAD as actions taken to degrade, destroy, or neutralize one or multiple 
aspects of an air defense system, to include enemy fighters.  Second, this paper will illustrate 
how this is an operational rather than a tactical-level military task.  Third, by treating the North 
Vietnamese defenses as an integrated whole, this thesis will provide evidence that there were 
critical nodes whose destruction would have unraveled the entire system.  Fourth, it will illustrate 
that the United States Air Force was incapable of detecting, identifying, and destroying these 
nodes from 1965 through 1968.  Fifth, it will show that it was this weakness, not civilian 
interference, that that led to the extraordinary losses of Operation Rolling Thunder.  Sixth, it will 
present evidence showing that the Air Force’s leaders, rather than drawing on these experiences, 
instead made an informed decision not change USAF’s SEAD doctrine.  Finally, as noted, the 
following pages will demonstrate that this unwillingness to change resulted in the Air Force’s 
defeat during the Linebacker Operations in 1972.
                                                 
 
1Michael Maclear, Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, 1945-1975 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1981), 304-305; John Pimlott, Vietnam: The Decisive Battles (London: Marshall Editions, 1997; Edison, New 
Jersey: 2003), 160-171; Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter 
Offensive (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007),, 22-31; John Schlight, “Vietnamization and 
Withdrawal, 1968-1975,” Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume II, 1950-
1997, Bernard C. Nalty, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 295-336; and 
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, USA ret., Thiet Giap!: The Battle of An Loc, April 1972 (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 3. 
 
 2 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 394-395 and 588. 
 
 3 For examples of Air Force publications promulgating this viewpoint, see Porter, Linebacker: Overview 
53-55 and 57-69; James R. McCarthy, Brig. Gen., USAF and George B. Allison, Ltc. USAF,  Linebacker II: A View 
from the Rock, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, ed. Colonel Robert E. Rayfield (USAF), Volume VI, 
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Monograph 8 (Maxwell AFB, AL: 1979; Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985); Colonel Mike 
Worden’s Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leaders, 1945-1982 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press, 1998), 196-198; or Thomas C. Hone “Strategic Bombing Constrained: Korea and Vietnam,” Case 
Studies in Strategic Bombardment, R. Cargill Hall, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1998), 469-
526 with particular attention paid to 517-520. 
 
 4 Earl H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air 
University Press, June 1991), 288-297; Clodfelter, 201-202 and 207-210. 
 
5 At a minimum, there were serious questions as to the American military’s ability to fulfill the United 
States’ NATO obligations or carry out limited nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union using SAC’s bombers. 
 
 6 Edward Luttwak and Stuart Koehl, The Dictionary of Modern War  (New York: Harpers-Collins, 1991), 
514. 
 
 7 Ibid.. 
 
 8 James R. Brungess, Lt. Col., USAF, Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint 
War Fighting in an Uncertain World (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1994), 35-47. 
 
 9 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms April 2001 
(As Amended Through 9 June 2004) (Washington, D.C., 2004), 513. 
 
 10 Anthony M. Thornborough and Frank B. Mormillo, Iron Hand: Smashing the Enemy’s Air Defences with 
Tony Cassanova & Kevin Jackson (Somerset, England: Patrick Stephens Limited, 2002; Reprint Sparkford, 
England: Sutton Publishing, 2002).  All subsequent page citations are to the reprint edition.  Further research does 
not indicate why there was a reprint published in the same year as the original. 
 
 11 Ivan Rendall, Rolling Thunder: Jet Combat From World War II to the Gulf War (New York: Dell Books, 
1997). 
 
 12 Examples of work which provide this view are Michael L. Michel III’s Clashes: Air Combat Over 
Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997) and Craig C. Hannah’s Striving For Air 
Superiority: The Tactical Air Command in Vietnam, Texas A&M Military History Series #76, Joseph G. Dawson 
III, Ed., (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). 
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CHAPTER 2 - The Importance of Doctrine 
First, it is important to properly define doctrine.  As with SEAD, there are numerous 
opinions on what exactly this simple word encompasses.  For example, The Dictionary of 
Modern War states that doctrine consists of “[o]fficially enunciated principles meant to guide the 
employment of military forces under specified conditions.”1  The current Department of Defense 
dictionary, Joint Publication 1-02, considers doctrine to be “[f]undamental principles by which 
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.”2  This 
study will combine these definitions to consider doctrine as a military organization’s 
methodology for the conduct of war in support of specific operational and strategic objectives.   
The importance of doctrine is clear from the definitions above.  Without a doctrinal 
template, the vagaries of war can rapidly reduce a powerful military force to an undisciplined 
mob.  In contrast, a military force that enjoys a well-developed, flexible, and widely 
disseminated doctrine is able to rapidly shift forces and change its force structure in order to 
meet a variety of threats.  Therefore, once senior leaders decide upon a doctrine, it is incumbent 
on a military service to ensure that these guiding principles are widely propagated among its 
commanders and their staff.  This way, in case of a conflict, there will not be a period where 
disparate units have to figure out methods for accomplishing their tasks.  An effective military 
doctrine combined with rigorous training minimizes the effect of friction or unforeseen events.  
In contrast, an ineffective or rigid doctrine often leads to rapid, repeated defeats and, in most 
cases, to losing the war.   
USAF Doctrine, 1953-1960 
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In order to understand how USAF reached its doctrinal nadir in Vietnam, it is necessary 
to explain doctrinal development in the previous decade.  From 1953-1960, the civilian leaders 
of the United States provided the Air Force with contradictory guidance on how it wished to 
employ USAF against the threat of Communism.  This confusion was understandable, as the Air 
Force had only become a separate service in 1947 and initially been brandished as a “big stick” 
during the period of America’s atomic monopoly.  However, with the Soviet Union’s atomic 
detonation in 1949, China’s transition to Communism that same year, and the subsequent Korean 
War (1950-1953), this strategic equation changed before the Air Force had a chance to fully 
develop as a separate service.   
Thus, in June 1953, both the Air Force and the nation as a whole stood at a civil-military 
crossroads.  On one hand, the Korean War had indicated that there could be conflicts between 
American and Communist forces that did not result in World War III.  Those who adhered to this 
view believed that the military should be prepared to conduct operations at all levels of warfare 
rather than simply believing similar crises would not happen again.  On the other hand, there 
were arguments that it was the United States’ trepidation and lack of resolve which had led to the 
Korean War’s inconclusive ending.  Military officers and civilians who held this view pointed 
out that it had merely taken President Eisenhower hinting that he would use atomic weapons to 
bring an end to the Korean War.  With the advances in weapons technology brought out by 
thermonuclear weapons, the United States would be able to prevent Communist incursions by 
developing forces which were capable of holding the Soviet Union itself hostage.  Should war 
break out the United States, led primarily by Strategic Air Command (SAC), would  strike 
quickly, violently, and decisively before the U.S.S.R. could respond. 
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In his first term, President Eisenhower chose to maintain the cheaper option—keeping a 
strong nuclear capability while maintaining a relatively small conventional ground force.  The 
latter would, in the most likely scenarios, be provided by the nation being attacked by 
Communist forces.  Dubbed Massive Retaliation, Eisenhower’s doctrine was intended to prevent 
the United States from having to undertake the fiscal burden of maintaining both a large 
conventional force and an effective nuclear striking arm.3  Put very simply, the American 
military would let its allies’ absorb the brunt of a conventional assault by the Soviet Union’s 
proxies.  Should the U.S.S.R. assault America’s allies itself or threaten the use of nuclear 
weapons, it would in turn be destroyed by the United States Air Force’s bombers.4   
Peacetime or Armageddon 
 
This civilian guidance had a profound effect on Air Force doctrine.  Led primarily by 
former bomber leaders Nathan F. Twining, Thomas D. White, and Curtis E. LeMay, the Air 
Force rewrote its doctrine with a heavy focus on nuclear delivery.5  A layman reading the 1953 
edition of the Air Force’s doctrine, AFM 1-3 Theater Operations, could have easily believed that 
the Korean War had not occurred.  Generals Twining and LeMay both realized that nuclear 
warfare, more than any other type in history, rewarded the side that struck first and hardest.  
Unlike World War II, a potential World War III would not allow the United States a period in 
which it could absorb blows while marshaling its strength.  Therefore, AFM 1-3 emphasized the 
offensive at all levels, from the operational to the strategic.  In the view of the document’s 
authors and the leaders who approved it, the United States Air Force was expected to operate as a 
homogenous force whose operations were decisive in their own right.6   
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This decisive approach to operations, unfortunately for the Air Force, created a singular 
view of future conflicts.  Regardless of the location, once the Soviet Union or proxy struck at a 
U.S. ally, the United States would be required to respond with a nuclear attack.  In the early 
stages of a potential conflict, USAF would seek to deliver its arsenal against the Communist 
bloc’s military, industrial, and political infrastructure.  The Air Force would carry out this attack 
with great speed and violence in order to prevent the U.S.S.R. from turning a planned decisive 
victory into a Pyrrhic triumph by virtue of a nuclear counterstrike.  Beginning with the periphery 
of the Soviet Union, USAF forces would strike at theater-level targets both to destroy their 
opposite numbers on the ground and to prevent the easy movement of hostile forces.7  Once this 
task was complete, SAC would strike at the Communist bloc’s “heartland” (i.e., the People’s 
Republic of China and U.S.S.R. proper) and complete the conflict.  Whereas World War II had 
taken a matter of years, Air Force leaders believed that this entire sequence would be complete in 
a matter of hours.8
Organizationally, this mindset meant that there was little need for tactical aircraft.  
Despite having just fought the Korean War, General Twining fervently believed there was no 
place for tactical aircraft in the Air Force.  USAF leaders thought that there was no real place for 
close air support when they only intended to develop more advanced nuclear ordnance and 
delivery platforms for the foreseeable future.  Since both the Army and Marine Corps were 
procuring their own tactical systems for use on the nuclear battlefield, Twining’s logic went, Air 
Force efforts to deliver atomic CAS would be both duplicative and unwelcome.9  If the Army 
and Marines were engaging first- and second-echelon forces with atomic howitzers and rockets, 
Twining and the Air Staff asked, what point was there in the Air Force maintaining capability to 
destroy these same forces?10  With neither of the other services providing a satisfactory answer, 
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the Air Force seized the opportunity to reduce their attention to close air support in order to 
maximize their striking potential. 
Similarly, the Air Force questioned the logic of maintaining air superiority fighters.  
Buying these craft, maintaining the airframes, and training the crews meant less money for 
USAF to spend on bombers.  Given that Air Force planners believed that it was impossible to 
defend against a properly executed nuclear bombing force, the best technique for air defense 
seemed to be smashing the enemy air force on the ground.  Although there were notional 
mentions of theater air defense in AFM 1-3, in reality Twining and other Air Force leaders 
believed the best defense was to reduce hostile airbases to irradiated craters as soon as the war 
began.  Therefore, once again, it made no sense for the active duty component of the Air Force to 
maintain tactical fighters, especially as these airframes would come at the expense of bombers.11  
Finally, and most importantly, Twining, White and LeMay all fervently believed in 
constructing an Air Force which focused solely on this nuclear mission at the expense of all 
others.  All three men thought that this specialization was vital to American security, as they 
were unified in their belief that deterrence was the key to America’s future.  Only if the Soviet 
Union’s leaders were certain that a future war would mean their immolation, their logic ran, 
would the Politburo be convinced to renounce aggression as a means for advancing communism.  
Twining, as Air Force Chief of Staff during the first Eisenhower Administration, posited to all 
who would listen that the Air Force was uniquely equipped to ensure this outcome.  Therefore, 
Twining continued on to argue not only that the Air Force should continue to receive the lion’s 
share of the military budget but also that it should be relieved of the requirement to train for 
other missions.  Anything else, at least in the view of Twining, White, and the bellicose LeMay, 
was certain to lead to a decline in the Air Force’s capability and, eventually, war. 
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Whither SEAD? 
 
The other services, as well the Pentagon’s civilian leaders, did not share in Twining’s 
logic.  For this and various other reasons, the other service chiefs, civilian secretaries, and the 
Secretary of Defense all thwarted General Twining’s attempts to eliminate TAC.12  However, 
while the smaller Air Force command continued to exist in name, General Twining and his 
successors, White and LeMay, did their level best to destroy its tactical capability.  The first step 
in this process was to change TAC’s leaders, beginning with the replacement of former fighter 
pilot General Frank F. Everett with a SAC officer, General Walter Sweeney.13  The second was 
to force TAC to focus on the nuclear delivery mission in training, exercises, and real world 
alerts.14  Finally, White and LeMay directed TAC to procure new airframes and equipment that 
emphasized nuclear delivery over its traditional missions of attaining air superiority, battlefield 
air interdiction, and close air support. 
This emphasis had many negative effects on the Air Force on a whole.  Nowhere was this 
more apparent than in the utter stagnation of SEAD doctrine.  At the beginning of Twining’s 
tenure as Chief of Staff, active air defense consisted of three basic components.15  The simplest 
of these was the ubiquitous anti-aircraft gun, ranging from small-arms caliber machine guns 
through large-caliber, high-angle cannon.  Although easy to produce, the tracking errors inherent 
to attempting to engage high-speed, maneuverable targets greatly limited guns’ capabilities.16  
As operational experience had shown the Air Force in Korea, jet aircraft’s greater speed 
enhanced this advantage.  Although there were many other mitigating factors that contributed to 
jets’ lower loss rates in the last two years of the Korean War, the lesson the Air Force took away 
from that conflict was that optically-aimed anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) was a lethal nuisance but 
hardly a major threat.17
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Fighters, as the second component of air defense in the early 1950s, were likewise lightly 
regarded by the Air Force’s planners.  Although USAF had been unpleasantly surprised by the 
advanced MiG-15, once F-86 Sabres were introduced American fighters rapidly achieved a kill 
ratio of 8 to 10 MiGs for every U.N. aircraft destroyed.18  Since in many cases Chinese or Soviet 
“volunteers” had flown the MiGs, Air Force planners believed that USAF’s advantages in 
training would hold over to any potential nuclear conflict.  Furthermore, the American aerospace 
industry was perceived as making far more rapid advances in technology than their Soviet 
counterparts due to the regular breakage of altitude and speed records by USAF.  Finally, the 
regular penetration and evasion of Soviet interceptors by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft led to a 
contemptuous attitude of among many of the Air Force’s leaders (and, to be honest, their civilian 
superiors).19  When obsolescent, subsonic bombers were regularly bringing back pictures of the 
U.S.S.R.’s Ural Mountains industrial complexes or flying over Vladivostok in broad daylight, it 
is not hard to understand why this occurred.   
Part of the reason for these easy penetrations had to do with the state of the third 
component, radar, in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union had entered World War II without 
radar and had few indigenous systems by the end of that conflict.  Even with the rapid advances 
made possible by the absorption of German research, Soviet radars remained far behind those of 
the United States.  Therefore, the early systems were too bulky, temperamental, or fragile for use 
with forward troops and thus limited to stationing around major cities or industrial areas.  In this 
role the radars remained extremely susceptible to simple countermeasures such as chaff, had 
problems providing tracking information against fast-moving targets, and could not detect 
aircraft flying at low altitude.20   
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Combined, the weakness inherent in the three components meant that USAF planners did 
not develop a SEAD doctrine because they did not see the purpose.  With the adoption of 
massive retaliation as national policy, the Air Force believed its capabilities and equipment 
guaranteed a short war rather than protracted conflict.  To Twining, LeMay, and their peers this 
meant that, at most, TAC aircraft would have to fly three sorties—one to their dispersal airfields, 
one to catalytic phase targets, then one more to whatever targets were assigned to them during 
the general war phase of a nuclear conflict.21  Air Force planners generally assumed that Soviet 
defenses would attrit the aircraft during the catalytic phase at the same rate as their Communist 
counterparts had in Korea, which meant that over 99% would survive the first strike and be 
available for “heartland” operations.22  Even in a less favorable scenario, e.g., if Soviet defenses 
and the vagaries of nuclear warfare translated to a loss rate ten times that of Korea, TAC’s 
availability rate for “heartland” operations would be over 98%.   
This analysis and similar studies of loss rates likely explain a lack of Air Force SEAD 
doctrine through 1955.  When doing absolutely nothing to suppress enemy air defenses still 
meant over 98% of a strike force would survive the entire conflict, what logical reason was there 
for spending training and acquisition dollars on SEAD?  There wasn’t any, at least not as long as 
the assumptions behind USAF doctrine remained valid.  From 1953 through 1956, General 
Twining and his successor, General White, had no reason to believe that American Cold War 
strategy, available aerospace technology or, most importantly of all, the Soviet Union’s 
technological capabilities would undergo major changes.  With the reelection of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in November 1956, the Air Force seemed poised to retain its primacy in U.S. 
military affairs.  From this perspective there was no need to write an overarching SEAD 
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doctrine, as no additional guidance was necessary—the Air Force’s leaders believed their way of 
war would be successful.    
Harbingers of Change 
 
As with many other large military organizations throughout history, the Air Force clung 
to this perspective even as the foundations upon which it was built shifted from 1956 through 
1965.  First, the Soviet Union chose an asymmetric approach to solving the problem of 
America’s strategic superiority.  Rather than attempting to match SAC’s strength in bombers, 
aircrew proficiency, and infrastructure the Soviet Union chose to invest in the development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).  With the launch of Sputnik I (October 4, 1957) the 
Soviet Union demonstrated a nascent ability to deliver nuclear warheads throughout the 
continental United States.  By combining their space coup with a successful propaganda 
campaign that greatly exaggerated the size of their bomber fleet, the U.S.S.R.’s leaders forced a 
radical change in American policy.  Alarmed by the seemingly overnight development of Soviet 
missiles and production of a fleet of heavy bombers, President Eisenhower and his advisors 
became convinced that massive retaliation was untenable as a national policy.  In these men’s 
minds it was one thing to engage in a brutal, but one-sided, nuclear clubbing that would 
eliminate the Communist threat once and for all.  It was quite another to engage in a war whose 
“victor” would be only marginally better off than the “vanquished.”23   
President Eisenhower directed the Air Force to begin developing countermeasures to the 
Soviets’ perceived bomber capability.  Unfortunately, in the absence of firm guidance and with 
General Twining (now serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) providing political cover 
to General White, the Air Force only nominally met President Eisenhower’s intent.  First, 
 14
General White suggested increasing the production of B-52s rather than the Air Force investing 
heavily in ICBMs of their own.  Second, White argued for the abolition of Air Defense 
Command, as he believed that the sheer number of Soviet bombers would preclude a successful 
air defense of the United States.  Finally, General White, ably assisted by General LeMay, 
attempted to convince Congress of the necessity of investing in the modernization of the existing 
B-52 fleet.24   
Although these machinations may appear to have only a tenuous relationship to SEAD 
doctrine, their devastating effect belied their seeming obliquity.  First, in order to pay for more 
B-52s the Air Force had to make cuts in TAC’s training across the board.  This fiscal slashing 
grew even more pronounced when the Eisenhower Administration forced General White to 
increase funding for ICBM development and the expansion of Air Defense Command.25  
Second, due to the expansion of Air Defense Command and prominence of the interception over 
the air superiority mission, Air Force began to rely more and more upon missile armament for its 
fighters.  As tests with these new weapons indicated that they were capable of achieving a 
probability kill (Pk) in excess of 80% per round, USAF’s leaders saw another opportunity to 
reduce costs by reducing air combat maneuver (ACM) training.  This decision also had the 
secondary benefit of reducing training crashes and thus providing another cost-saving measure.26  
Finally, with the heavy emphasis on ensuring that the bomber fleet was capable of penetrating 
Soviet air space there was little incentive for the aerospace industry to develop smaller 
penetration aids for fighters.27   
The need for penetration aids was readily apparent by 1960.  The late 1950s saw a 
technological renaissance with regard to the development of surface-to-air missile systems.  
Realizing that they had to protect their carriers, the United States Navy had developed their 
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famous triad of Talos, Terrier, and Tartar systems.  Likewise, after being informed the Air Force 
would not be responsible for front line air defense due to TAC’s nuclear role, the U.S. Army 
developed the HAWK system for tactical use and continued the development of the Nike family 
for strategic air defense.28  Even excluding the Air Force’s own abortive Bomarc program, there 
were over a half-dozen completed or soon to be fielded surface-to-air missile programs within 
the United States inventory alone.  If one added only the systems available in the rest of the 
West, the number of systems that would be available by 1960 became over a dozen.   
The world’s militaries, by expending so much effort in fielding viable SAMs, pushed 
anti-aircraft technology into a new era.  There is no document that illuminates why the Air Force 
failed to consider this burgeoning threat in its doctrine.  However, the available evidence 
provides some clues.  Given General Twining, White, and LeMay’s belief with regard to the 
possibility of successfully defending the United States, it is unlikely that they believed the Soviet 
Union could field an effective air defense system themselves.29  Even if the Soviet Union tried, 
however, Air Force leaders were probably of the opinion that the system’s components would, 
for various reasons, be limited to use within the U.S.S.R..  Therefore, countering such a system 
remained a strategic problem and therefore not something that should concern TAC or those 
required to employ TAC’s aircraft.   
This elevation to the strategic level ensured that USAF SEAD doctrine would remain 
stillborn due to SAC’s capabilities.  By 1960, all B-52s were capable of being armed with the  
Hound Dog missile and were projected to be equipped with the advanced Skybolt system.  Both 
of these weapons had a range far in advance of any known or projected SAM system on either 
side of the Iron Curtain.  Although their operators could shuffle them between prepared 
positions, the majority of SAMs in the late 1950s could only be fired from prepared, immobile 
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sites.  In case of a general war, B-52s possessing recent intelligence photographs would be able 
to neutralize these immobile systems from over the radar horizon.  Therefore, SAMs were not a 
problem and thus did not need to be addressed in doctrine.   
Even the loss of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 on May 1, 1960, to Soviet SAMs had little 
discernible effect on the Air Force’s stance.  Other than directing B-52s to begin preparing for 
low-level ingress as they approached their targets, the Air Force did not view this first successful 
use of SAMs as an incident requiring fundamental changes in how it viewed the air defense 
environment.  Given that the U-2 possessed no electronic countermeasures, flew at relatively 
slow speeds, and had been at high altitude when it was shot down, the Air Force planners likely 
believed that changing the B-52s profile was sufficient.  Such reasoning was sound, but it served 
to indicate a continued focus on the nuclear mission despite President Eisenhower’s guidance. 
Further illustrating this trend was the Air Force’s continued belief in civilian leaders’ 
unwillingness to engage in limited conflict.  Beginning with the Quemoy crisis in 1955, the 
Eisenhower Administration demonstrated that it was willing to deploy Air Force units in order to 
demonstrate American resolve.  In most cases (e.g., the Hungarian, Suez, and Quemoy Crises) 
this did not result in fighting.30  In the Formosa Crisis of August 1958, however, USAF fighter 
pilots joined the forces of Nationalist Taiwan in engaging Communist Chinese pilots in air-to-air 
combat.31  Despite the overt and direct engagement of U.S. forces by a Communist nation and 
increased tensions, President Eisenhower did not begin the strategic conflagration that White and 
Lemay believed would naturally follow from an exchange of fire.  Instead, as noted in the Air 
Force’s official history, “[General White] declared the ominous presence of the Strategic Air 
Command forced the People’s Republic of China to suspend operations” against Nationalist 
Taiwan.32  In light of this world view, the development of SEAD doctrine was both unwarranted 
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and unnecessary.  As will be shown, the negative impact of these beliefs would be both far 
reaching and long-lasting with regard to SEAD doctrine.  It would take the crucible of war to jar 
the Air Force’s leaders out of its wholly nuclear focus.
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CHAPTER 3 - A Pressing Need for SEAD: Operation Rolling Thunder 
Air Force doctrine, for the most part, did not change from 1958 until 1965.  There were, 
however, several major external events that affected both the Air Force in general and the 
development of SEAD doctrine in particular.  First and foremost, Senator John F. Kennedy won 
the 1960 Presidential Election over Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard Nixon.  The former 
had railed against a “missile gap” his entire campaign and, even more importantly, believed that 
the President of the United States should have a wide range of military options at his disposal in 
order to carry out America’s Cold War strategy.  Once Kennedy assumed office, he found not 
only that was the “missile gap” was a myth but that President Eisenhower’s 1958 reforms had 
already begun the process of alleviating any actual or perceived strategic vulnerabilities for the 
foreseeable future.  With the exception of forcing the services to eliminate redundancy in 
targeting, President Kennedy needed to take little action.1
The issue of having a wide range of options, however, proved far harder to deal with.  In 
order to accomplish the necessary reforms within the Department of Defense, President Kennedy 
appointed Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense.  Confident (some would say arrogant), 
possessing a fine mind for detail, and almost fanatical in his faith in analytical research, 
McNamara had made his reputation as a Ford auto executive.2  Taking the office shortly before 
General LeMay became Chief of Staff of the Air Force, McNamara wasted little time in starting 
his process of shaping the Pentagon to Kennedy’s will.  After examining the Pentagon’s war 
plans, the Secretary of Defense perceived that the services were still too focused on the nuclear 
mission and acted decisively to rectify this problem.  Although the Army, Navy, and Marines all 
suffered blows to cherished programs, the Air Force suffered the most by far.  Within the first 
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year of taking office, McNamara killed the successor to the B-52 (XB-70), cancelled the 
advanced Skybolt missile, cut planned B-52 production, and forced the Air Force to accept cost-
saving measures that would allow the realignment of the nation’s other armed services.3   
General LeMay, as Air Force Chief of Staff, fiercely resisted these measures in private.  
The remainder of the Air Force’s leaders closed rank behind their Chief of Staff.  In closed 
hearings, General LeMay and his subordinates testified that the planned cuts would weaken 
Strategic Air Command’s bomber fleet and, by extension, the United States.  In public, the Air 
Force commissioned several studies that contradicted the research of civilian organizations (e.g., 
the RAND Corporation).  Having resisted the Eisenhower Administration’s attempts at forcing 
the Air Force to prepare for a wider range of conflict and believing their doctrine to be the only 
method to keep America safe, USAF’s flag officers spent the first two years of the Kennedy 
Administration attempting to force their civilian leaders to conform to their view of how best to 
employ the United States’ military power rather than vice versa.4   
The State of the Air Force, February 1965 
 
These efforts, in addition to bordering on insubordination, were a spectacular failure.  
With regard to the Air Force in general, the flag officers’ revolt justifiably ended LeMay’s career 
(he was only extended a single year in the name of political expediency) and, much less 
reasonably, destroyed what little influence the Air Force had with the overbearing McNamara.5  
Doctrinally, the energy expended meant that the Air Force was unable to develop new 
conventional doctrine before USAF was fully committed against North Vietnam in February 
1965.  TAC, as the primary conventional component of the Air Force, went to war with doctrine 
that the Air Force had promulgated at the conclusion of the Korean War.  Its pilots, due to their 
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continued focus on the nuclear delivery mission, were wholly unprepared to conduct 
conventional operations.  There was no discussion of even rudimentary SEAD tactics at the wing 
and squadron level, and the majority of the pilots were largely unaware of the advances made in 
anti-aircraft technology.6  Unlike their Navy counterparts, the majority of whom had at least 
been exposed to air defense radars due to task force training operations, these men lacked any 
understanding of SAM or radar-directed gunfire’s capabilities.  As noted by an Air Force 
monograph, in 1965 “over 50 percent of fighter pilots had more 2,000 total flying,” yet many of 
these men were woefully inexperienced in the practical application of firepower in a modern air 
defense environment when Rolling Thunder began.7   
Exacerbating TAC’s poor level of conventional training was the unsuitability of its 
equipment.  Although there were several other types still in service, TAC’s two primary aircraft 
in February 1965 were the Republic F-105 Thunderchief and the McDonnell Douglas F-4 
Phantom.  The former, a massive strike fighter from Republic Aviation, epitomized both the 
overwhelming influence of the nuclear mission and the dearth of SEAD doctrine in the Air 
Force.  Developed to deliver a single nuclear weapon to a target deep within an opponent’s 
territory, the F-105 was the fastest aircraft in the world below 10,000 feet.8  When the Air Force 
selected the aircraft for production in the 1950s, Air Force planners had believed that its speed 
and terrain-masking tactics would allow the fighter to evade guns and outrun fighters.  Although 
this position was arguable in 1958 when TAC began large-scale fielding of the Thunderchief, 
this was not the case seven years later.  In 1965, an organization that had an adequate SEAD 
doctrine, trained in accordance with these underlying principles, and remained abreast of modern 
air defense technology might have realized that the F-105 had several major vulnerabilities.  
USAF did not meet any of these descriptions, and therefore its leaders did not consider the 
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Thunderchief’s lack of an internal jammer, radar warning systems, or even simple active 
protective systems (e.g., chaff) as major shortcomings.9  Instead, they believed that TAC’s 
Thunderchiefs would be able to carry out their nuclear attacks with little difficulty. 
The Air Force similarly failed to apply critical thought to the Phantom.  In the F-4’s case, 
this lapse was somewhat understandable, as it was originally a United States Navy interceptor.   
Secretary McNamara, believing that there was too much duplication in the Pentagon, saw in the 
Phantom an opportunity to both save defense dollars and increase the Air Force’s conventional 
capability.10  The Air Force, once Secretary McNamara informed its leaders they had little 
choice in the matter, was quick to extol the Phantom’s virtues and accept the aircraft as just 
perfect for TAC’s fighter mission.11  This was partially true, as the Phantom was fast, had a 
powerful radar, and could carry eight missiles that had performed extraordinarily well in tests.  
However, like the F-105 it lacked internal avionics that would have allowed it to detect, jam, or 
spoof enemy radars and SAMs.  Even worse, given its alleged focus on enemy fighter aircraft, 
once it expended its missile armament the F-4 lacked an internal gun with which to continue the 
engagement.12  As the Phantom’s AIM-9 Sidewinders and AIM-7 Sparrows continued to enjoy 
high success rates in tests, the fighters’ operators did not see this as a problem in 1965.13  Air 
Force leaders, it appeared, did not believe that combat conditions would be radically different 
from those in tests over the Mojave Desert and Gulf of Mexico. 
Conventional Operations, Gradualism, and SEAD 
 
In reality, the skies over North Vietnam would prove radically different from not only the 
Air Force’s test ranges but also USAF’s experiences in Korea.  The United States’ long, painful 
intervention in Southeast Asia has been well-documented elsewhere and, in the interest in space, 
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will not be recounted here.  By February 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson believed that it 
would serve America’s strategic interests to intensify operations in Southeast Asia.  Confident 
that the North Vietnamese could be intimidated into no longer providing support for the South’s 
Viet Cong guerillas, President Johnson directed the Navy and Air Force to begin sustained aerial 
operations against the DRV.  Whereas previous air raids had been specifically targeted reprisals, 
the President intended for these raids (dubbed Operational Rolling Thunder) to gradually 
increase pain across all of North Vietnamese society until communist leader Ho Chi Minh 
accepted the division of Vietnam into northern and southern halves as had been done with 
Korea.14  
The Myth of Civilian Restrictions 
 
There were many problems with how the Johnson Administration approached employing 
the Air Force, but the three most commonly cited when promulgating the myth of civilian 
interference will be dealt with here.  First, President Johnson failed to elucidate a proper strategic 
focus.  There were, according to multiple sources, four broad objectives to Operation Rolling 
Thunder.  Johnson’s primary objective was to avoid conducting an air campaign so intense that 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Soviet Union was compelled to enter the conflict.  
The guidance on this, as well as the restrictions emplaced in order to prevent it, was quite clear.  
Less clear, however, was how an Air Force attempting to break North Vietnam’s will (Rolling 
Thunder’s second purpose) could accomplish this.  Air power, rather than being a scalpel or even 
a vise, was a blunt object of limited scalability.  Like a medieval mace, aircraft being used to 
“break” anything lose much of their effectiveness if the blow is limited in any way.  Instead, both 
are most effective when swung with energetic malice and great abandon.  In inhibiting the Air 
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Force while simultaneously exhorting them to hit harder, President Johnson and Secretary 
McNamara were giving seemingly contradictory orders.  Moreover, there were few attempts to 
determine what would break the North Vietnamese people’s will, how long it would have to 
remain broken, and whether this breakage was in the United States’ long-term strategic 
interests.15
Further complicating the matter was the desire to interdict supplies flowing from North 
Vietnam to the Viet Cong.  Not only was it not clear if there were sufficient airframes in the 
Pacific Theater to accomplish this task in and of itself, but adding it in addition to the above 
tasks put a great strain on the Hawaii-based Pacific Air Force Command (PACAF).  The 
continued need for air assets in Korea, other commitments around the world, and the need to 
provide close air support in South Vietnam had already stretched USAF’s resources in the 
Pacific.  Inexplicably, men as devoted to systems analysis as McNamara or as “scientific” as the 
rest of his staff were unable to realize that they may have been attempting to do too much.  A 
process as simple as reviewing previous air interdiction campaigns, the area they had covered, 
extrapolating the tonnage dropped, then applying this to Vietnam would likely have shown just 
how daunting an interdiction campaign was in and of itself.  Instead of doing this, however, 
Johnson and McNamara simply demanded that the Air Force and Navy accomplish yet another 
objective in addition to the previous two.  When one adds the last objective (demonstrating 
American resolve), it becomes abundantly clear that the Johnson Administration was operating 
out of its strategic depth.16    
When coupled with the rigidity with which President Johnson and Secretary McNamara 
attempted to control operations, this strategic ambivalence has led to much of the intervening 
years’ historiography blaming these two men for the many losses that followed.  The Air Force, 
 26
as the service that had delivered the most ordnance and suffered the most losses, was the most 
vocal with its criticism.  This began with relatively benign comments in CHECO reports (e.g.,  
“JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] targeting practices added a distinct, and as it turned out, significant 
variable to tactical planning”).17  By 1971, however, the Air Force was openly critical of its 
former civilian masters, with another CHECO report on Operation Linebacker stating that 
“Rolling Thunder was conducted under severe, often crippling, restraints.”18  In 1976, General 
William W. Momyer, commander of the primary Air Force organization conducting strikes 
against North Vietnam (the 7th Air Force), stated that he “deeply resented the proscription of 
attacks on North Vietnamese airfields, SAM and AAA sites, and other targets.”19   
Lower-ranking officers were even harsher in their criticism.  Even worse, they were 
public in their vitriol.  For example, Colonel Jack Broughton called these restraints “sick” in his 
bestseller Thud Ridge.20  Broughton then went on to elaborate: 
It’s sick because we handcuff ourselves on tactical details.  First we 
oversupervise and seem to feel that four-star generals have to be flight 
leaders and dictate the details of handling a type of machinery they have 
never known.  Second, we have lost all sense of flexibility, and we 
ignore tactical surprise by insisting on repeated attacks without 
imagination.  Third, our intelligence, and the interpretation and 
communication of that intelligence, is back in the Stone Age.  Fourth, 
our conventional munitions are little improved over 1941 and those who 
insist on dictating the ultimate detail of their selection, fuzing and 
delivery do not understand or appreciate their own dictates.  (This, of 
course, assumes that they have adequate quantities and varieties on hand 
to be selective.)  Fifth, we have not advanced far enough in the field of 
meteorology to tell what we will have over the homedrome an hour from 
now.  Our degree of accuracy on vital details like bombing winds over 
the target is abominable.  Sixth, many of our high-level people refuse to 
listen to constructive criticism from people doing the job.21
 
The majority of memoirs, documents, and secondary sources written about the Vietnam 
War follow the thrust of the above paragraph.  Indeed, if simply taken at face value, the 
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preponderance of books, articles, and memoirs would indicate that President Johnson and 
McNamara, in addition to providing poor strategic direction, completely handcuffed the military.  
In turn, this handcuffing is what led to the destruction of almost 1,000 American aircraft over 
North Vietnam from 1965 through 1968, prevented the Air Force and Navy from bringing the 
North Vietnamese to the peace table, and set in motion the long path that culminated in Saigon’s 
defeat in 1975.  
So prevalent and pervasive is this view that any work addressing the air war over North 
Vietnam must address it, and this study is no exception.  To state that the civilian controls of the 
military were the primary cause of Rolling Thunder’s ineffectiveness and heavy losses is to 
ignore the United States’ martial tradition.  As Lieutenant Colonel Ed Cobleigh put it in his own 
memoir War For the Hell of It, “[c]ivilian control of the U.S. military is a cornerstone of our 
democracy and must not be compromised, no matter how dire the situation.”22  Put another way, 
President Johnson and Secretary McNamara were acting well within their Constitutional 
authority and duty in sharply limiting the military’s actions during Operation Rolling Thunder.  
It was not McNamara and Johnson’s first responsibility to win the war in Vietnam but to 
preserve the United States.  Put in the language of a different scenario, no one in the Johnson 
Administration was ready to trade Chicago for Saigon. 
In this light, it becomes much easier to understand that Johnson and McNamara did not 
intend to conduct their actions in a capricious manner.  Instead, both men were erring well on the 
side of safety in ensuring the accomplishment of their first strategic goal.  Both men had 
observed the damage done to the nation when President Truman failed to keep General 
MacArthur in check during the halcyon days after the Inchon landings.  Whereas in 1950 this 
had led to Chinese intervention and near destruction of U.N. forces on the Korean peninsula, 
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there was a real possibility that Russian and Chinese intervention in Vietnam could quickly lead 
to a broadened (and nuclear) conflict.23  General LeMay indicating that this event would be a 
positive outcome by virtue of allowing a first strike on the People’s Republic of China’s nascent 
nuclear program probably did little to alleviate either President Johnson’s or Secretary 
McNamara’s fears.  If one considers the civil-military climate, especially given the various crises 
of 1961 through 1964, it is easy to understand why the Air Force was given very clear directives 
and limitations.24
By constantly focusing on these directives, those who attempt to demonize President 
Johnson and McNamara almost completely ignore the process that led to the friction between 
those two men and their military commanders.  In 1958, President Eisenhower had made it quite 
clear that massive retaliation was no longer the United States’ overarching military policy.  In 
1960, his successor had run on the principle that a Chief Executive ought to have more options 
than defeat or mass murder.  President Kennedy had then appointed a Secretary of Defense who 
fully understood this tasking less than a year later.  Rather than going along with the reforms of 
either President, the Air Force had fought them tooth and nail.  Furthermore, when both 
Presidents had responded to major crises without authorizing a first strike, Generals White and 
LeMay had not absorbed that conventional operations were not an anomaly.  Instead, both men 
had respectively trumpeted to all who would listen that it was the Air Force’s nuclear prowess 
that had allowed America to prevail. 
Therefore, when President Johnson turned to air power to salvage Vietnam, it was not his 
restrictions that led to the savaging of U.S. aircraft.  As Momyer himself stated, “self-imposed 
restraint has been a fact in all U.S. conflict since World War II, and obviously our hope in the 
age of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is that some restraint will be exercised by all 
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superpowers in all future conflicts.”25  Instead, it was the decision, conscious or otherwise, of the 
Air Force’s leaders to not acknowledge the effects that strategic parity (perceived or real) had on 
the conduct of American foreign policy which contributed to the service’s heavy losses during 
Rolling Thunder.  Rather than, as one Air Force officer has put it, “scream[ing] for changes to 
the operational conduct of the air war” the Air Force’s leaders should have been finding effective 
ways to minimize losses in a conventional environment.26  That they did not do so, contrary to 
what numerous sources imply, is no one’s fault but those of the uniformed officers leading 
USAF. 
The North Vietnamese-IADS 
 
Rolling Thunder forcefully drove home just how far these leaders had fallen behind in 
understanding air defense technology.  When the Air Force began striking North Vietnam, the 
North Vietnamese only had guns with which to repel American air strikes.  Of these weapons, 
the overwhelming majority had been heavy machine guns or automatic cannons, with 
obsolescent radars controlling the few large-caliber cannons.27  In part because of the limitations 
of these systems, the United States Navy and Air Force were able to destroy most of them during 
one week in March 1965.  With the guns forced to optical control, North Vietnam lay largely 
supine before American air power.28  This situation, however, rapidly changed once China and 
the Soviet Union chose to supply North Vietnam with weapons, equipment, and training in order 
to avoid losing prestige with other Third World nations.  In addition to giving the appearance of 
aiding a fellow Communist nation, the Chinese and Soviets were also given an opportunity to 
test their weapons and techniques in a realistic environment versus their likely opponents.  
 30
Combined, these factors meant that the NV-IADS grew from its humble beginnings to, by 1968, 
the deadliest air defense network in the world outside of the Soviet Union itself.29
It was not merely the weapons themselves that made this network deadly but how the 
North Vietnamese employed them.  Unsurprisingly, the North Vietnamese did not necessarily 
strictly adhere to either Chinese or Soviet air defense doctrine.  Unlike their larger patrons, the 
DRV did not have extensive operational depth with which to attrit an attacking American force 
before it reached its target.  Nor could the North Vietnamese realistically expect to project power 
over the Gulf of Tonkin or into Thailand.  These two factors meant that the North Vietnamese 
could not engage in a true air superiority campaign like those waged by the major powers in 
World War II or, for that matter, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force in northern Korea. 
Counterbalancing these negatives, however, was the fact that the North Vietnamese did 
not have to plan for a nuclear exchange or, for that matter, a wholesale attack against their 
civilian population.  In this same vein, even if an American air strike was successful during 
Rolling Thunder, there was no single facility whose loss would truly cripple the North 
Vietnamese war effort.  Combined, these factors meant that the North Vietnamese could ensure 
that conditions were favorable to their forces rather than having to make every effort to stop 
USAF’s fighters.  Aiding the DRV’s military in optimizing the terms of their engagement was 
the fact that terrain, political and military constraints, and the previously mentioned lack of 
operational depth served to restrict American aircraft’s ingress and egress routes.  Viet Cong 
insurgents made this problem worse by limiting the number of aircraft that could be based in 
South Vietnam.  Unable to expand their bases in that country, the Air Force based the bulk of its 
strike fighters in Thailand.  In addition to greatly lengthening USAF’s flight time and requiring 
the use of SAC’s tankers, this meant that the NV-IADS commanders had additional time to 
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marshal their resources even if they could not attack into Thai air space.  With all of these 
conditions, the North Vietnamese elected to conduct an air denial, rather than air superiority, 
campaign.  Just as they intended to exhaust the United States’ Army in the South, the North’s 
leaders expected to bleed the United States Air Force white as long as it attempted to strike the 
DRV.30
 Command and Control 
 
Controlling this campaign was the responsibility of the NV-IADS command and control 
(C2) nodes.  The most important component of the NV-IADS, these four North Vietnamese Air 
Defense Command sub-headquarters were located within Hanoi and Haiphong.  Tasked with 
coordinating the movements of the other three components (anti-aircraft artillery [AAA], MiGs, 
and SAMs) in order to avoid fratricide and cause the most damage to American air strikes, each 
center was commanded by a flag officer of the North Vietnamese Army.  Each of these 
command nodes, in turn, was fed information by several sub-components.  First, there was an 
extensive network of early warning radars whose medium and high-altitude coverage extended 
across neighboring Laos to the west and well out into the Gulf of Tonkin to the east.  By virtue 
of detecting American strike aircraft well in advance, these systems allowed the North 
Vietnamese to quickly determine the speed and direction of an approaching American strike.  
Second, there were numerous electronic intelligence (ELINT) and radar intercept stations that 
would attempt to discern 7th Air Force’s targets for the day.  Finally, there were the reports given 
by defense assets in action, all of whose secondary job was to keep higher headquarters abreast 
of the Americans’ progress so North Vietnamese commanders could direct additional forces 
against a strike if conditions were especially favorable.31   
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AAA Systems 
 
The simplest of these three assets were the aforementioned guns.  By 1968 the range and 
type of guns available to the NV-IADS commanders were truly impressive.  Motivated by both 
patriotism and the exhortations of their party cadre, almost the entire North Vietnamese populace 
was engaged in anti-aircraft defense.  The regular anti-aircraft forces of the North Vietnamese 
Army used a widely disparate suite of cannons, the majority of which were controlled by the 
Fire Can radar and associated gunnery system.  Unlike its predecessors, the Fire Can was 
capable of tracking multiple, high-speed targets from low altitude (around 1,000 feet) through 
roughly 60,000 feet.32  These capabilities meant that, contrary to what USAF’s leaders had 
believed, anti-aircraft guns remained a very lethal threat to modern jet fighters.  Although the 
Fire Can could be jammed, 7th Air Force strikes ignored the system at their peril. 
The heaviest AAA weapons were 85- and 100-mm cannons which could engage 
incoming USAF and USN strikes up to 39,000 feet.   Fortunately for American pilots these 
weapons’ rate of fire and fuzing requirements greatly decreased the effectiveness of their 
barrages.33   Just beneath these heavy guns, however, were 57- and 37-mm cannons.  The former 
was a compromise between the larger cannons’ heavier hitting power and lighter weapons’ faster 
rate of fire.  The latter, despite being laid optically, fired rapidly enough that well-trained crews 
could still manage to track fast-moving jets. 
At the base of NV-IADS gun pyramid were the countless small arms of the North 
Vietnamese populace.  As one USAF report noted: 
Added to all [the heavy weapons] was what one THUD pilot called the “Hanoi 
Habit”: even waitresses would run outside and start firing when the sirens 
sounded, using weapons from 7.62 rifles to the WW II Browning M-2 .50 calibre 
(sic) machine gun.34
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While the mental image of a cocktail waitress leaving her patrons in order to go outside and fire 
a few rounds up into the air may be amusing in the abstract, in reality those rounds costing a few 
cents were only slightly less likely to contribute to the destruction of a multi-million dollar jet 
aircraft than their larger cousins.  Flying over North Vietnam at less than 10,000 feet was an 
exercise in calculated risk.  Thanks in no small part to the waitresses, farmers, and other militia 
members flying at 5,000 feet altitude near a target would almost assuredly end in casualties.  
Like citizens playing a macabre lottery, every North Vietnamese saw an American air strike as 
an opportunity to strike a jackpot.35
 The Air Force’s leaders had not taken these defenses into account when determining their 
attack tactics.  As they had planned to do in Europe, F-105s began air operations against North 
Vietnam by ingressing at low altitude, pulling up to 10,000 feet to dive-bomb their target, then 
egressing using the Thunderchief’s superior speed.  The North Vietnamese, after determining 
USAF ingress and egress routes, began siting the guns accordingly.  Furthermore, they also 
mixed the guns at each site so that the various cannons could complement one another.  The final 
effect was to create a veritable steel curtain in USAF’s fighter’s paths.  The F-105s, unlike their 
World War II and Korean predecessors, proved unable to pierce this curtain.  All too often, a 
heavy shell burst was close enough to pierce the Thunderchiefs’ unprotected fuel tanks, a cannon 
round struck their fragile engines, or the aforementioned cocktail waitress and her fellow militia 
members were lucky enough to hit the unprotected hydraulic lines of a low-flying Thud.  F-4s, 
increasingly carrying bombs as the number F-105s were attrited, did not fare much better.  In 
order to lessen losses, strike aircraft began to ingress and egress at high altitude.36
SAMs 
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This solution to the ferocity of North Vietnam’s AAA defenses brought USAF’s fighters 
squarely into contact with the next component of the NV-IADS—the SAM.  Originally fielded 
by the Soviet Union in 1957, the U.S.S.R.’s military conceived the SA-2 as a counter to SAC’s 
high-flying bombers.  By the time the Soviets offered the Guideline (which they called the 
Dvina) to the North Vietnamese, they considered it obsolescent.  Nonetheless, North Vietnam 
began constructing SA-2 sites in April 1965 and, within two months, had begun receiving 
training on the system from Soviet officers.37  The Air Force, alarmed by this development, 
asked permission to strike these initial Guideline sites while they were under construction.  
Secretary McNamara, concerned with killing these Soviet military personnel and believing the 
deployment to be a political ploy by the USSR, refused to authorize the strikes.  Although this 
would have possibly delayed the deployment of the SA-2, it is unlikely that it would have 
stopped it.  Regardless, the North Vietnamese and their Soviet advisors repaid this caution with 
the destruction of Leopard 2, an F-4 Phantom, on July 24, 1965.38  With this single stroke, the 
North Vietnamese and their Soviet advisors greatly complicated USAF’s offensive.  
There was little that should have been remarkable about the SA-2 when the Americans 
first encountered it, as the basic missile had not changed in its eight years of service.  The 
Guideline was a two-stage weapon that was fired either singly or as part of a salvo from a fixed 
site.  After a boost phase and separation of the first stage, the missile’s accompanying Fan Song 
radar van guided the SA-2 towards a target up to 25 miles away utilizing a data link.  With a 
maximum effective altitude in excess of 80,000 feet, a speed over three times the speed of sound, 
and a 420-lb. warhead, the Guideline could not be outclimbed, outrun, or survived by the tactical 
fighters used to penetrate into the heart of North Vietnam.39  If seen in time, however, the missile 
could usually be outmaneuvered, yet at the cost of depleting an aircraft’s energy.40  When the 
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Guideline was fired as part of a salvo (a common tactic), this meant that American aircrews often 
found themselves blundering squarely into the path of a second Guideline or, even worse, the 
NV-IADS AAA envelope.41
The entry of SAMs led to a variety of countermeasures.  The first method, ingressing and 
egressing below the Guideline’s minimum altitude, quickly became untenable due to the 
increased exposure time to AAA.  The two Thunderchief wings subsequently modified this tactic 
as F-105s were hurriedly fitted with Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) sensors.  Instead of 
remaining at low altitude, F-105 pilots only dove to avoid SAMs if the fighter-bombers received 
warning that a Fan Song was possibly tracking them or their flight.42  Even though this was 
better than nothing, it was far from optimal given the similarity between the Fan Song and Fire 
Can’s signals.  To a pilot transitioning through the densest North Vietnamese defenses (e.g., 
Route Packages 5 and 6), reacting to the RHAW transformed a mission to a virtual roller coaster 
ride into and out of the heart of the AAA envelope.43   
As losses continued to mount, the Air Force developed their two final solutions for 
dealing with the SAM sites: Wild Weasel aircraft (discussed later in this paper) and electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) pods.  The Air Force had first explored utilizing ECM pods in 1957, but 
initial efforts were less than optimal and required up to date intelligence on what hostile systems 
would be present at the target.44  Unimpressed with the outcome and believing that tactical 
fighters would not need jammers in order to penetrate defenses at low level, the Air Force had 
decided that continued development was not a budgetary priority.45  With the North Vietnamese 
providing deadly impetus for rethinking how their doctrine viewed air defense, the Air Force 
initiated a crash program to develop a more effective jamming pod.   
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The end result, the QRC-160, protected first the F-105 strike force and then, as numbers 
increased and the pods improved, their F-4 escorts.  Although carrying the jamming pod meant 
that an aircraft could carry less ordnance, pilots and Air Force leaders considered the protection 
gained from turning a Fan Song or Fire Can’s screen into an unreadable mass of lines worth the 
cost.  As long as the equipped aircraft flew straight and level at around 18,000 feet, the various 
pods greatly reduced the effectiveness of radar defenses.  This protection grew almost 
exponentially if the aircraft was part of a tight, precise flight dubbed the “pod formation” (see 
Appendix B).  Although the Fan Song could burn through the jamming at around six miles, the 
SA-2’s minimum effective range of 4-5 miles meant that effective engagements would have 
required an extremely effective crew.  Losses to the SA-2 initially dropped rapidly after the 
pods’ introduction, but there were periods of increased vulnerability due to North Vietnamese 
Fan Song operators changing their radars’ frequency in November 1967.46  Even though 
American ELINT quickly ascertained these new frequencies, with Air Force systems command 
making the necessary modifications to maintain effectiveness, it was clear that the pods as well 
as the formations were not the optimal solution to stop the Dvina.47
Northern Bandits: MiGs 
 
Part of the reason for dislike of the pods had to do with the final component of the NV-
IADS: MiGs.  Named for the Mikoyan Gurevich company, their usual manufacturer, MiGs were 
North Vietnamese interceptors which attempted to destroy USAF strike aircraft by using air-to-
air missiles or mounted cannon.  Ground control intercept (GCI) stations guided these North 
Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) fighters to their prey via radio.48  The pod formation, as the Air 
Force quickly found out, made this process much easier.  Although individual MiG pilots 
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demonstrated proficiency with their aircraft once the GCI had placed them in position, there are 
no indications that MiGs ever took off and operated freely as their American counterparts were 
able to do.  Similarly, if American forces were able to spoof the North Vietnamese ELINT 
efforts (as they did during Operation Bolo in January 1967), GCI controllers could be enticed to 
place MiGs into disadvantageous situations.  However, these occasions were rare and all too 
often it was the MiGs that were able to strike with surprise on their side.  The MiGs would 
exploit this surprise by either continuing through their initiated attack or, if sighted by escort 
fighters, acting as a diversion for another MiG.49  If the MiG continued through its attack, the 
NVAF considered the destruction of an American aircraft or the forced jettisoning of ordnance 
equally good outcomes.50  Once its firing pass was complete, the MiGs usually sought to escape 
rather than attempt to dogfight the American aircraft.  
All three of the primary North Vietnamese fighters were well-suited to this aerial guerilla 
warfare.  The simplest of the trio was the MiG-17 Fresco, a subsonic cannon-armed interceptor 
that the NVAF used for point defense of selected North Vietnamese locations.51  Highly 
maneuverable, the MiG-17’s designers had optimized it for the swirling, close-range 
engagements that fighter pilots often dubbed “knife fights.”  This meant that, unlike the Phantom 
and Thunderchief, the small Fresco had a very large wing for its weight and thus greater 
maneuverability.  Although it lacked the radar suite, power-boosted controls, or raw speed of 
either American fighter, the MiG-17 was fast enough to catch a heavily laden Thunderchief or 
Phantom at low altitude, provided the GCI placed it in a favorable position.  If this occurred, the 
MiG-17’s three cannons (1 x 37mm, 2 x 23mm) were more than capable of downing any 
American aircraft.  Although its relatively unsophisticated control arrangement, inability to catch 
unladen American aircraft, and relatively poor high-altitude performance meant the Fresco was 
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far from an optimal air superiority fighter.52   However, this was not what the North Vietnamese 
intended it for and, more importantly, it was enough of a threat at low altitude that loaded F-105s 
were forced to respect it.53  
More sophisticated than the MiG-17 was its Rolling Thunder stablemate, the MiG-21 
Fishbed.  Like the Fresco, the Mikoyan-Gurevich company designed the Fishbed as a point-
defense interceptor whose effectiveness depended on the quality of its supporting GCI net.  
However, unlike the Fresco, the MiG-21 could conduct high-speed slashing attacks utilizing two 
heat-seeking Atoll missiles.  Only after the MiG-21 had fired these heat-seekers did the NVAF’s 
commanders expect a Fishbed pilot to close into cannon range and finish off potential targets.  
Whereas the North Vietnamese used the Fresco as a knife-fighter, the Fishbed operated as a 
Parthian aircraft which fired its ordnance, turned away as its missiles were inbound, then fled 
before the U.S. escort could react.  If the Fishbed was caught, however, its poor rearward 
visibility, inferior handling qualities at low to medium altitude, and tendency to lose energy 
rapidly in turns usually resulted in the MiG-21’s destruction.54
Given the NVAF’s tactics, the best fighter for North Vietnam was one that combined the 
best of the Fishbed’s and Fresco’s attributes.  The Soviet MiG-19 was just such an aircraft, but 
the NVAF was unable to acquire any models before the end of Rolling Thunder.  In 1969, 
however, the NVAF acquired the MiG-19 / Shenyang J-6 Farmer from China.  Like the Fresco, 
the MiG-19 had great pilot visibility, was equipped with a formidable cannon armament of three 
30-mm cannon, and extremely maneuverable.  In addition, like the Fishbed, the Farmer was 
capable of supersonic flight at all altitudes and could carry the AA-2 Atoll for hit and run attacks 
on American formations.  Despite requiring a great deal of maintenance and only being fielded in 
 39
relatively small numbers, the Farmer was an unpleasant surprise for American forces once 
operations resumed in 1972.55  
Fighting the IADS: USAF SEAD Doctrine During Rolling Thunder  
 
The strength and skill with which the North Vietnamese defended their nation came as an 
unpleasant shock to the Air Staff.  Rather than acknowledging this fact, the majority of Air Force 
theses, documents, and contemporary accounts blame civilian leaders’ restrictions for allowing 
the NV-IADS’ development.  To the proponents of this argument, President Johnson and 
Secretary McNamara crippled the Phantom’s ability to dominate the NVAF’s MiGs by 
forbidding the use of Sparrow missiles in beyond visual range (BVR) engagements.  
Furthermore, by not allowing U.S. forces to engage SAM sites until they fired, President Johnson 
and Secretary McNamara prevented the launching of an anti-SAM offensive.  Finally, by not 
allowing the Air Force to strike airfields, control centers within North Vietnam’s populations 
areas, or other leadership targets within Hanoi or Haiphong, American civilian leaders did not 
allow the Air Force to engage in decapitation strikes in order to disrupt North Vietnamese 
command and control.56
 
On their surface, these arguments seem reasonable.  However, they ignore one pressing 
problem: USAF of 1965 lacked the training, ordnance, or tactics to destroy the elements of the 
NV-IADS.  There were many reasons for this, but underlying all of these was the pervasive lack 
of SEAD doctrine prior to the start of Operation Rolling Thunder.  Prior to 1965, the Air Force’s 
leaders provided each unit with its assigned targets yet allowed individual TAC wing and 
squadron commanders to devise their own tactics for getting there.  Therefore, the Air Force that 
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began Rolling Thunder attacked the growing North Vietnamese defenses with a hodgepodge of 
techniques that reflected each wing commander’s personal experiences rather than a reasoned 
approach that matched the technology at hand.  As conditions over North Vietnam quickly 
proved or disproved pre-war assumptions, individual units adjusted to what did or did not work. 
Although senior civilians’ (and, to varying degrees, senior generals’) interference did not 
help this process, accusing them of necessitating it is excessive.  Instead, a perusal of AFM 1-3’s 
pages quickly illuminates the proper culprit: lack of attention.  AFM 1-3 devoted less than a page 
to enemy defenses, discussing them in this manner: 
(8) Countermeasures: 
 
(a) The nerve center of any modern air defense system consists essentially of 
electronic devices and equipment. It is primarily by these means that invading air 
forces are detected and located. After they are located, electronic devices assist in 
their interception and destruction. Antiaircraft artillery fire also is, to a large 
extent, controlled electronically. 
 
(b) Certain types of offensive airforce operations are facilitated and their 
success enhanced by the complementary actions of electronic countermeasures 
operations. Such complementary operations tend to disrupt and confuse the 
enemy, and thus permit greater success to the main operation. Airborne 
countermeasure devices are complex and require highly trained personnel for 
effective operation. 
 
(c) Due to the far-reaching implications of countermeasure operations their 
planning and employment transcend the responsibility of any single theater. The 
overall agency charged with the direction of the war determines the role each 
theater will perform in accomplishing certain countermeasures. The theater 
countermeasures’ program is controlled at theater level, and is harmonized with 
the global plan on a continuing basis. In this manner, a concerted action is 
achieved which provides all forces irrespective of assigned tasks optimum benefit 
from such measure to deceive and confuse the enemy.57
 
Failing to Exploit a Vulnerability: USAF ECM Doctrines 
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Combined, these three paragraphs indicate that USAF officers thought of air defense in 
the following ways.  First, the Air Staff clearly believed all air defenses were vulnerable to 
electronic countermeasures.  However, they also held the opinion these systems were too 
complex for their operation to be entrusted to anyone other than highly trained electronic warfare 
officers (EWO).  Since the Thunderchief was a single-seat aircraft and the Phantom’s second 
crewman was initially a second pilot, not an EWO, this meant that Air Force doctrine likely 
acknowledged that TAC fighters lacked the capability to penetrate sophisticated air defenses.  
However, as the Air Force’s leaders had believed SAMs and other defenses would be reserved 
for the Soviet heartland, it followed that TAC’s fighters would be unlikely to encounter them.  
Although controlling the countermeasures as part of a global plan all but ensured that theater 
commanders would not possess the assets to alleviate this shortcoming if the Air Staff was 
incorrect in their assumptions, given the expected short duration of future campaigns the Air 
Force’s leaders did not believe this would be a problem.  After all, given TAC’s catalytic 
purpose in the mind of Air Force planners, SAC’s nuclear tsunami would either sweep over 
hostile theater defenses or render them impotent by annihilating the Communist “heartland.”   
American command and control arrangements were less than optimal during Operation 
Rolling Thunder and this may appear to be the reason the Air Force was unable to apply its ECM 
doctrine to operations over North Vietnam.  However, joint interoperability issues would likely 
have prevented the centralization of all ECM assets operating over North Vietnam under one 
commander even if the Route Package system had not been in place.  Not only were the Navy’s 
electronic warfare objectives different from those of the Air Force but, for that matter, the USN’s 
tactics were quite different.58  Furthermore, Navy aircraft had different performance parameters 
at low altitude (especially once the F-105 delivered its ordnance) and one service or the other 
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would have had to greatly modify its attack methodology.  This would have led to longer 
exposure times for one or both services’ primary strike aircraft and, in execution, cancelled out 
the likely benefits of massing electronic warfare assets.59  Finally, geographical constraints 
would have made proper coordination extraordinarily difficult.    
In addition to the functional issues, the “theater” commander argument ignores Momyer’s 
travails in using those electronic assets he did control.  PACAF, concerned with the possible loss 
of an EB-66 Destroyer, limited deployment of these aircraft against North Vietnam.  USAF’s 
leaders considered Destroyers to be strategic assets and thus 7th Air Force had to preserve the 
aircraft for use in a general nuclear war.  Therefore, PACAF responded to any attack on or, even 
worse, loss of one of these aircraft with ever greater restrictions.  Not only was Momyer 
forbidden to deploy these aircraft into the heart of North Vietnamese defenses, by the end of 
Rolling Thunder he was forced to maintain these aircraft at the very limit of their effective 
jamming range.  In addition, fear of NVAF MiGs meant that 7th Air Force had to provide their 
attached Destroyers with ever heavier fighter escorts.  In short, USAF’s doctrinal inclination to 
centralize control of its ECM assets did not lead to the development of a global plan that 
supported the theater commander.  Instead, the fear of losing what few global assets were 
available led to a theater paralysis.60   
The Changing Paradigm of Air Superiority: Direct Attack on the NV-IADS 
 
The situation with regard to direct physical attack on NV-IADS was not much better than 
that of ECM in 1965.  As explained above, wholesale focus on the nuclear delivery mission 
meant that the equipment, mechanisms, and tactics for conventional attack of enemy air defenses 
had been allowed to atrophy after Korea.  This meant that the United States Air Force entered 
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North Vietnam facing systems developed during the late 1950s with the same techniques that it 
had used in World War II and Korea.  Due to the primitive nature of the weapons that the Air 
Force had fought in those conflicts, this meant that TAC developed tactics that focused on 
accomplishing a discrete, single mission rather than being part of a larger plan.  However, in 
order to understand the operational implications, it is necessary to examine these methods briefly 
here. 
 Iron Hand Flights 
 
The Air Force began Rolling Thunder with extremely limited means for defeating AAA 
systems.  The simplest method was engagement with the F-105’s internal 20-mm Vulcan.  With 
a cyclic rate of 6,000 rounds a minute, this Vulcan easily shot faster than any AAA weapon in 
the North Vietnamese inventory.  This weapon, however, was outranged by all of NV-IADS 
anti-aircraft cannons.  Furthermore, in the words of Colonel Broughton, “[North Vietnamese] 
gun pits were well coordinated to insure the maximum field of fire” and would have had multiple 
guns to the Thunderchief’s one.61  Given the Thunderchief’s fragility, this made a gun duel 
fraught with danger for even the best-trained USAF pilot.  The Phantom, despite being a multi-
purpose fighter and arguably more survivable, lacked a gun.  In addition to all these facts, the 
sheer number of North Vietnamese AAA systems meant eliminating them would be a time-
consuming task. 
Far more efficient, however, was external ordnance.  In 1965, the Air Force’s inventory 
was extremely limited.  High-explosive bombs, by far the most numerous option, were greatly 
limited as they required a direct hit in order to silence the dug-in North Vietnamese guns.  
Napalm, in addition to being highly unpopular due to its inaccuracy, required fighters to fly 
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straight and level during its delivery.  Similarly, rockets required fighters to fly a predictable 
path.  Thus, both of these weapons were not suitable for use over North Vietnam.  Finally, and 
most effectively, there were cluster bombs.  However, there were only limited numbers of these 
weapons through 1967, with the Air Force having to split the meager supply with the Navy and 
forces operating within South Vietnam.62   
Although most Rolling Thunder strike formations had a flight of aircraft assigned as 
“Iron Hand,” or flak suppression, these flights focused solely on defenses in the target area.  
Initially assignment to this mission was done in an ad hoc manner, with strike commanders 
having authority to divert flights from the main target onto nearby defenses.63  In no small part to 
the unsuitability of high-explosive bombs (required to destroy the primary target) these flights 
carried, wings began to assign specific F-105 or F-4 formations as “Iron Hand” flights.64  
Although this made flak suppression more effective, it was far from an optimal solution.  If the 
Iron Hand flight held its ordnance until it reached the target area, the North Vietnamese AAA 
along the ingress and egress routes were able to engage without retaliation.  In contrast, if the 
Iron Hand flight attempted to suppress defenses along the ingress and egress route, the tasked F-
105s often lacked enough ordnance to properly suppress the guns in the target area.  Eventually, 
heavy losses forced USAF to fly a hi-lo-hi profile in order to mitigate the effectiveness of the 
optically-aimed AAA and trust in the EB-66s’ jamming to reduce the Fire Cans’ ability to track 
the attacking fighter-bombers.   
Destroying SAM Sites and Radars 
 
This decision to enter at high altitude meant that 7th Air Force had to do something about 
the SA-2 sites as well as their controlling radars.  Like almost all land-based radars of the era, the 
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Fan Song had to remain stationary in order to perform its function.  Although this meant that the 
North Vietnamese often had several hours to shift sites between American strikes, during the 
strike it meant a radiating Fan Song was a relatively easy target.  As the radar had to remain 
active throughout the Guideline’s flight in order to be fully effective, an SA-2 site that was 
attacking provided a very strong electronic signature.  These signals, in turn, could be detected at 
roughly two to three times the Fan Song’s effective range.65  In effect, an SA-2 site was a large, 
immobile, and fragile target that was extremely susceptible to the right ordnance. 
The main issue was finding the SA-2 site in the first place.  Since both the Phantom and 
Thunderchief had been built without internal RHAW apparatus, for the first few months of 
Rolling Thunder USAF fighter pilots were at a severe disadvantage versus the Dvina.  F-4 and F-
105 pilots had little inkling when a Fan Song was even active and, thus, could not track the radar 
back to the source.  Attempting to detect the site by visual means was difficult due to camouflage 
capability of the North Vietnamese and required descent into the AAA envelope.66  Even worse, 
there was no guarantee that what the naked eye saw was actually an active site.  For example, 
when the Air Force attempted to retaliate against the site which downed Leopard 2, North 
Vietnamese decoys convinced the pilots that they were attacking a fully-manned Guideline site.  
After photo reconnaissance aircraft conducted post strike photo runs 7th Air Force realized the 
North Vietnamese had rigged up dummy missiles and then surrounded the area with AAA 
positions.  As the mission’s planners had directed the use of napalm and rockets (due to their 
expected high Pk), the ruse worked perfectly.67
It was clear that 7th Air Force needed something better.  One mission provided a glimpse 
of the future when, after coordinating with the Navy for an A-4 and pilot, the Air Force 
destroyed the first of many SAM sites on October 31, 1965.68  On one hand the mission proved 
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that small attack aircraft could detect SA-2 sites and vector non-RHAW aircraft onto the target 
by voice radio.  On the other hand, had the North Vietnamese destroyed the Navy A-4 prior to its 
arrival in the target area, the F-105s would have been unable to attack the targeted SAM site.  It 
was obvious that more improvements were needed or else the Air Force would be unable to 
continue operations over North Vietnam.  Aware of this vulnerability, the Air Force moved with 
alacrity and the Chief of Staff, General McConnell, directed USAF Systems Command to find a 
solution as quickly as possible.69   
The final concept was for two-man (pilot and EWO) aircraft to be used in direct attacks 
against the SA-2 site.  Dubbed “Wild Weasels,” these fighters were equipped with highly 
sensitive radar detection equipment that allowed them to detect hostile radars along the path of a 
strike force.  Once this was accomplished, the “Wild Weasel” would fly along the bearing to the 
hostile radar, acquire it visually, then roll in and mark the target with white phosphorus rockets.  
Once the target was so marked, an accompanying flight of fighters would then proceed to attack 
the radar and any surrounding defenses with underwing ordnance.  Targeting these aircraft 
primarily against the SA-2’s Fan Song radar, the Air Force expected the Wild Weasel concept to 
be the answer to the SAM menace.70
This faith would have been rewarded had the Air Force’s speed been matched with 
wisdom.  The initial choice for the Wild Weasel aircraft was the two-seat F-100F Super Sabre.  
Put into production shortly after the end of the Korean War, the Super Sabre had had many 
problems throughout its service life.71  However, the F-100Fs were immediately available and 
the Air Force believed the aircraft’s performance would be suitable for operations over North 
Vietnam.  Testing at Eglin AFB in Florida reinforced this initial assumption, as the aircraft and 
crews showed little difficulty in acquiring and vectoring F-105s against a simulated SA-2 site.72  
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Believing that it had found a solution to its SA-2 problem, the Air Force slowed the urgency with 
which it began developing follow-on systems.73
This confidence did not last for long.  Once the first Wild Weasel detachment arrived at 
Korat Air Force base on 25 November, 1965, several issues became apparent.  The first was that 
the F-100 lacked the maneuverability for the assigned mission.  As the Super Sabre had been 
known as a “pilot killer” throughout its service life, this was not surprising to the assigned Wild 
Weasel crews.74  What was surprising, however, was that the F-100s were unable to keep up 
with an ingressing strike force of F-105s despite being armed only with rockets while the 
Thunderchiefs carried heavier bombs.  This had not been the case at Eglin, but Air Force 
Systems Command had not thought to simulate the effects long-range flights would have on the 
F-100Fs’ endurance.  This unhappy discovery meant that the F-100Fs and their accompanying F-
105 flight either had to enter North Vietnamese air space well ahead of the strike group, operate 
at lower speeds in order to conserve fuel, or risk being out of position in order to destroy 
attacking SAM sites.75  Finally, the F-100F airframe did not possess sufficient structural 
integrity for the mission at hand. 
The Super Sabre’s unsuitability quickly translated into losses.  The initial detachment of 
Wild Weasel crews and their F-100Fs arrived at Korat Air Force Base on 25 November 1965.  
By 11 March, three of the first nine F-100Fs had been lost to ground fire and one overstressed 
beyond repair.  The remainder were so damaged that they could not field enough aircraft to 
support operations into Route Package V and VI.76  The Air Force, satisfied that the initial 
detachment had proven the concept, rushed the next set of Weasel aircraft (F-105Fs) and crews 
to the theater, then rotated many of the initial Weasel pilots back to Nellis Air Force Base in 
order to open a training program.   In addition to selecting the Thunderchiefs as the next 
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airframe, the Air Force also increased the number of AGM-45 Shrike missiles from the Navy.  
As Rolling Thunder continued, the Wild Weasels would transition to the next airframe (the F-
105G) and add the AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missile (StARM) to their inventory.  
Although these missiles, improved airframes, and other more lethal ordnance (e.g., reliable 
cluster bombs, better marking rockets) were introduced, losses remained heavy among the radar 
suppressors.77   
Many of these losses were suffered due to a lack of SEAD doctrine.  With no overarching 
guidelines on how to use this new equipment, 7th Air Force was left to find its own way.  There 
were several negative outcomes to this decision.  First, rather than unifying the Wild Weasels at 
one air base, 7th Air Force split the aircraft between the F-105-equipped 355th and 388th TFWs.78  
This arrangement had the positive of simplifying the Weasels’ ability to support the strike wings 
to which they were attached.  The negatives, however, far outweighed this solitary advantage.  
By separating the Wild Weasel squadrons, 7th Air Force made maintaining these specialist 
fighters more difficult by requiring maintenance crews at two bases rather than one.  In addition, 
the geographical separation prevented the ready exchange of tactics or observations, slowed the 
issuance of improved equipment, and prevented the central stockpiling of Weasel-specific 
munitions (e.g., Shrike and StARM).79   
Combined, these shortcomings decreased combat efficiency during Operation Rolling 
Thunder.  With regard to future developments, the differences in tactics employed by the two 
Thunderchief strike wings inhibited the development of a standardized training syllabus for the 
Wild Weasel school at Nellis AFB.80  Had the Air Force only developed a rudimentary SEAD 
doctrine in 1966, this guidance may have facilitated the massing of the Weasels’ efforts by the 
end of Rolling Thunder.  Instead, attrition drove Wild Weasel detachments down to as few as 
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four aircraft per wing.  This was barely enough airframes to allow suppression in the target area, 
much less during ingress and egress.  Supporting the available Weasels with a flight of hunter-
killer F-105Ds only alleviated the problem somewhat.  All too often, the Wild Weasels found 
themselves in the same position as the Iron Hand flights: too many targets, too little ordnance.  
Even though their psychological effect was great upon North Vietnamese radar operators and 
losses from SAMs consequently dropped, this still left the initiative with the NV-IADS.81
Airframe and ordnance limitations also contributed to the Weasels’ steady losses.  Due to 
ECM emitters’ interference with their radar detection equipment, the Wild Weasels were initially 
forced to fly without the jamming pods that protected their F-105D brethren.  Even when the 
Weasels received compatible pods (November 1967), they could not easily maintain the pod 
formation given their requirement to hunt down and kill SAM sites.  Further complicating their 
task were the limitations of the initial RHAW suites.  Lacking range-finding finding capability, 
the Weasels’ initial sensors only provided a bearing to the targeted SAM site.  At this point, 
attacking a SAM site became a struggle between the Weasel crews’ knowledge of the area and 
the North Vietnamese troops’ ability to camouflage and defend themselves.  With atmospheric 
conditions limiting visibility from the air, Weasels were often required to expose themselves to a 
large number of optically laid weapons in order to attack an SA-2 site with bombs or their white 
phosphorus rockets.  As the F-105F and G shared the same survivability issues as a standard F-
105, this meant every Weasel attack was the equivalent of a knight running a gauntlet of archers 
in order to duel with a dragon at the far end—even if initially successful, the final outcome was 
very much in doubt.  With the Thunderchief’s limited maneuverability, all too often neither the 
two-seated Weasel nor its accompanying hunter-killer strike were able to get close enough to 
destroy the SA-2 site with bombs and rockets. 
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Finally, the North Vietnamese quickly developed countermeasures to the Wild Weasels.  
Even though equipping the F-105 with the Shrike reduced the need for a Weasel to overfly the 
targeted radar, Fan Song operators grew adept at rapidly exploiting the AGM-45s’ limitations.82  
In an attempt to alleviate this shortcoming, the Air Force acquired the StARM from the Navy.  
However, despite its longer range and heavier warhead, the AGM-78 was too expensive, too 
heavy, and fielded too late to be a truly effective weapon for the F-105 Weasel.83  In addition to 
exploiting the weaknesses of the Weasel’s ARMs, North Vietnamese SAM site operators greatly 
shortened the amount of time it took them to engage American aircraft.  Able to pick out the F-
105F/Gs by their maneuvers, the North Vietnamese made the hunter-killer flights priority targets 
for MiG attacks.  This often resulted in the F-105F/Gs having to abort their attacks against SAM 
sites in order to evade the MiGs. 
Combined, the heavy losses and their limited numbers meant Wild Weasels would 
remain a tactical solution to an operational problem.  This is not to say that these pilots, brave 
men all, were ineffective—they reduced losses and degraded the NV-IADS effectiveness 
whenever they were in the area.  However, due to their small numbers, the area the Wild Weasels 
covered was often small.  Even worse, due to the countermeasures listed above, it was rare that 
they were able to obliterate a SAM site or Fire Can completely.  Instead, even if the radar 
operators did not shut down their emitter in time, the missiles’ (especially the Shrike’s) limited 
warheads meant that the damage was often limited only to the antenna or radar van.  Thus, rather 
than killing the radar operators and missile crews, the Wild Weasels were often forced to allow 
them to survive to fight another day.  This, in turn, increased the North Vietnamese defenders’ 
proficiency—a far from optimal solution to the radar problem.84   
No Aces Here: Combating the MiGs 
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 This evolution of increasing skill on the North Vietnamese side and gradually eroding 
experience on the American side was not limited to the fight against radars and SAMs.  As in 
World War II and Korea, USAF sought to establish air superiority over North Vietnam from 
1965-1968.  Seventh Air Force never accomplished this task for many reasons.  The most 
commonly cited one is that civilian leaders curtailed Air Force freedom of action both against 
MiGs on the ground and in the air.  Proponents of the first line of thought argue that it was the 
decision to not allow 7th Air Force or, for that matter, USAF and USN combined to strike at Phuc 
Yen, Kep, and associated other airfields that allowed the North Vietnamese to build an effective 
MiG arm in the first place.  Then, once these MiGs were airborne, the restrictions requiring 7th 
Air Force pilots to identify their targets visually rather than allowing the Phantom to use its long-
ranged Sparrows to shoot MiGs forced USAF fighters to fight on NVAF terms.  McNamara’s 
detractors claim that these two actions in particular allowed the North Vietnamese to hold the 
initiative and thus ensured that the battle for air superiority had only one possible outcome.85   
These arguments are not supported by historical evidence.  First, the timeframe for which 
most authors castigate McNamara is March to November 1965.  However, those criticizing the 
Secretary of Defense for not allowing airfield strikes during this period ignore the fact that the 
JCS were recommending low-level night attacks by B-52 Stratofortresses.  Rather than serving 
as the primary strike force, tactical fighters were to be employed only if the B-52s did not 
completely devastate their assigned objectives.86  It is unsurprising that the Secretary may have 
been hesitant to use nuclear-capable bombers due to fears of escalating the Vietnam War.87  
Attacking North Vietnam with tactical fighters and their somewhat limited bomb loads was one 
thing.  Unleashing the very symbol of the United States’ strategic might was quite another.  
Whether this would have led to Chinese or Soviet intervention will never be known.  However, 
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what can be surmised is that Secretary McNamara and President Johnson had absolutely no 
intention of finding out. 
However, acknowledging that McNamara’s concerns were valid lends some semblance 
of credibility to those who attack him for not authorizing these attacks.  In reality, an objective 
examination of the myriad factors that would have affected the strikes removes even these few 
remaining tatters.  As they were oriented on the nuclear mission, the majority of SAC’s B-52s 
possessed extremely limited conventional capability.  This Air Force partially alleviated this 
problem by authorizing the “Big Belly” series of modifications, but none of these had occurred 
prior to late 1965.88  Therefore, as noted by an Air Force academic paper, B-52s would have 
been limited to “27 500 lb. or … [27] 750 lb. bombs internally.”89  In turn, these weapons would 
have had to be the conventional, low-drag variants of these weapons, as the B-52 was incapable 
of carrying any other type.  Without retardation, the B-52s would have had to drop from at least 
1,000 feet.  Given the need to acquire the targeted airfields by the Stratofortresses’ radar, a more 
realistic altitude would have been 2,000-3,000 feet, i.e., the heart of the AAA envelope and also 
at the lower end of the SA-2’s engagement capabilities.90  Although the B-52s ECM suite was 
quite advanced for the era, darkness would have degraded North Vietnamese AAA, and the 
NVAF was incapable of flying night operations, it quickly becomes apparent that the NV-IADS 
possessed more than enough capability to make an attack by slow, lumbering B-52s problematic.  
Therefore, those who claim that Secretary McNamara prevented effective attacks on North 
Vietnamese airfields, at least in the initial stages of Rolling Thunder, are both absolving the JCS 
of blame and ignoring the large number of relevant issues in order to seek a target for their 
frustrations. 
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That the JCS were even willing to consider B-52s, however, indicates just how much 
TAC’s ability to engage in conventional airfield attack had deteriorated.   This issue was not 
merely one of SEAD doctrine, but spoke to the difficulties inherent in conducting the counter-
airfield mission.  Indeed, it is unlikely that 7th Air Force possessed, at any time, a sufficient 
number of aircraft to conduct a sustained airbase destruction campaign and carry out the 
remainder of its Rolling Thunder tasks.  In 1965, the North Vietnamese had nine MiG airfields.  
By 1968 they had a total of nineteen.  It is unlikely that 7th Air Force, with only two 
Thunderchief wings in theater, possessed sufficient pure strike capability to attack repeatedly 
even the nine original bases and keep them out of commission.  Even if one doubles the number 
of available wings to four by forcing F-4s to carry their maximum ordnance and not pursue 
airborne MiGs and if one then adds the three or four carrier air wings the USN could provide 
from Yankee Station, the numbers are stark.  In addition, these numbers are only applicable if 
there was a period of sustained good weather, as only the USN’s A-6 Intruder was capable of all-
weather attack throughout Operation Rolling Thunder.  Combined, these factors make it clear 
that the airfield strikes McNamara’s critics envisioned were unfeasible from 1965 to 1968. 
Even had 7th Air Force possessed the necessary resources to attempt such a campaign 
there were still technical issues endemic to the Air Force through 1967.   First there were senior 
leaders’ justifiable concerns regarding collateral damage.  This, combined with the strength of 
target defenses, lack of intelligence, and 7th Air Force’s demonstrable problems with navigation, 
meant that the Air Force could not have struck some of these airfields.  Kep, Phuc Yen, and 
Giam Lam International Airport were all near major civilian population centers.  It is easy to 
argue that none of these problems were sufficient reason to avoid striking the bases in retrospect.  
At the time, it was likely much harder to see how killing an entire international delegation at 
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Giam Lam or having a fully loaded F-105 be forced to jettison ordnance over a Hanoi residential 
neighborhood would have served American war aims.  Military leaders, inexplicably, seemed 
oblivious to this possible outcome.  President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, on the other 
hand, were quite fearful of it.  The benefits of attacking the airfields were far less than the risk of 
Chinese or Soviet intervention. 
Target defenses were another area where military leaders seemed rather oblivious to 
realities in the area.  Although General Momyer would later argue that “strike forces were 
already penetrating the areas where airfields were located, and there were no major changes in 
the defenses the [North Vietnamese] could have employed that would have made our losses 
greater than they already were against other targets in the area,” this statement is somewhat 
disingenuous.91  Airfields, in general, are among the most difficult objectives for a strike force 
due to their unique construction.  Even though it would appear that all that is necessary is to 
crater the runway, most modern military airfields are constructed with taxiways that their 
stationed fighters can use for emergency takeoffs and landings.  In addition, runway craters are 
relatively easy to fill if sufficient manpower is available (which it was in North Vietnam), and 
the MiGs’ inherent capabilities to operate from rough fields would have greatly reduced the 
necessary repair times.  The revetments where these fighters were stored, in addition, meant that 
a single attacker would have great difficulty destroying more than one or two MiGs on the 
ground.  Finally, the fuel storage, pilot barracks, maintenance bays, and control facilities of a 
modern airfield present a series of dispersed targets for any attacker.92
Combined, these passive defenses would have meant that, in order to properly attack an 
airfield, a 7th Air Force offensive in late 1965 or early 1966 would have exposed the F-105s and 
F-4s tasked to accomplish it to more AAA and SAMs than any civilian target did during that 
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period.  This would have been especially true if the attacking fighter flights were chronologically 
spaced so as to allow for the clearance of smoke and dust and the prevention of fratricide due to 
bomb fragments.  Although this would not be true if the technique chosen had been for a multi-
wing low-level ingress, strike, and high-speed egress, this type of approach would have 
presented the defenses with the spectacle of thirty to forty tactical fighters occupying the limited 
air space over a MiG airfield while attempting to strike individual revetments, buildings, and 
grounded MiGs.  
In addition to giving whole new meaning to the phrase “target rich environment,” airfield 
strikes would have likely been ineffective.  USAF, based on its doctrinal beliefs, had not focused 
on attacking airfields as a tactical task.  This was understandable—it would be somewhat 
superfluous to pick out individual structures when TAC’s doctrine called for the use of multi-
kiloton bombs.  Even when the Air Force struck the associated MiG bases from 1967 on, the 
historical evidence indicates that there was little attempt to focus attacks on critical sub-
components as opposed to attempting to destroy MiGs.93  For example, a typical F-105 load for 
attacking an airfield was “a mix of CBU-24 bomblets and 750-pound bombs.”94  While the 
former was excellent at destroying MiGs on the ground and the latter sufficient to crater the 
runway, the NVAF enjoyed the same position with regard to aircraft and airfield availability as 
the RAF had during the Battle of Britain—the former was easily replaceable and the high 
number of the latter meant that any airborne MiGs had numerous places to which they could 
recover.   
It could be argued that, like the Luftwaffe in 1940, Seventh Air Force was concentrating 
on the wrong targets during Operation Rolling Thunder.  Given North Vietnam’s reliance on 
China and the Soviet Union for training, control technicians, maintenance crews, aviation fuel 
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and, most importantly, pilots may have proven far more difficult to replace than obsolescent 
MiGs.  However, in order to hit these targets, Air Force pilots would have had to vary their 
ordnance and gained proficiency in its use.  Given that F-105 crews arrived in Thailand without 
ever having even seen, much less dropped, the 3,000-lb. bombs which the Air Force used against 
heavy targets, it is unlikely that the latter would have occurred without concentrated effort.95  
The former, on the other hand, was difficult in an Air Force that initially lacked sufficient 
ordnance to properly arm its fighters at all, never mind acquiring more exotic weapons, e.g., 
rocket-propelled bombs suitable for penetrating either concrete or earthen shelters.96  This lack 
of appropriate ordnance meant that the Air Force would have had great difficulty in neutralizing 
North Vietnamese ground personnel, facilities, and pilots in the most efficient manner possible 
and was yet another reason airfield attacks were unfeasible. 
Whereas 7th Air Force may have found it difficult to destroy the NVAF on the ground, on 
paper there should have been little difficulty in defeating the MiGs once they were airborne.  The 
F-4, with its powerful radar, high speed, and missile armament would have seemed ideal for this 
task.  Even with the justified restrictions on BVR engagements, one might expect that the 
disparity in training hours flown and aircraft capabilities should have allowed 7th Air Force to 
quickly seize and hold air superiority from 1965 to 1968.97  Instead, a combination of USAF 
fighters’ flaws, Air Force hubris, and superior North Vietnamese tactics prevented 7th Air Force 
from eliminating the MiGs as a threat.  Although there were periods where the Americans gained 
the upper hand, NVAF interceptors still managed to challenge the majority of Rolling Thunder 
strikes to some degree.  By 1968 it was clear USAF’s pre-war beliefs about the nature of air 
combat had been deeply flawed.98
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Chief among these mistaken ideals was TAC’s concept of what constituted an ideal 
fighter.  The Century Series fighters (F-100, F-101, F-102, F-104, and F-106) and the Phantom 
had all been built with a focus on speed, climbing ability and, by the conclusion of the series, 
missile capability.  Initially, the Air Force had deployed the F-100 and F-104 as their primary air 
superiority aircraft.  However, in the often poor visual conditions over North Vietnam, neither 
fighter proved capable of dealing with the GCI-directed MiGs.  The Air Force quickly relegated 
the former exclusively to close air support and the Starfighter only lingered long enough to 
confirm its extreme vulnerability to SAMs before also being withdrawn.99  
This left the Phantom with its all missile armament.  The Air Force’s leaders had 
believed that the tests proved this combination would have great success, yet USAF pilots 
quickly realized the difference between targeting drones and thinking, adaptive opponents as 
they engaged the NVAF.  When Phantoms began engaging MiGs, they found that the Sparrow’s 
performance was far from optimal.  With its very high minimum range, a startling number of 
rounds that simply refused to fire, and proximity warheads that regularly failed to function even 
when the missiles passed close to their intended target, the AIM-7 quickly developed a 
reputation for unreliability with its users.  So common were these mishaps that Phantom crews 
regularly ripple-fired all four missiles in order to have a decent chance of attaining one hit.100   
Even with all four Sparrows expended, an F-4 nominally had four heat-seeking missiles 
remaining.  However, neither of the weapons available during Operation Rolling Thunder did 
much to improve missiles’ reputations.  The Sidewinder, in addition to being regularly 
outmaneuvered by the agile North Vietnamese fighters, found plenty of other heat sources to 
guide upon in the hot, humid climate of Southeast Asia.101  The other heat-seeking missile, the 
Air Force’s AIM-4 Falcon, had an even worse Pk due to its small warhead, lack of proximity 
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fusing, and complicated launch requirements.  So poor was the Falcon’s performance that, after 
the 8th TFW attempted to use the weapons for the first time, Colonel Olds directed his armament 
staff to break Air Force regulations and rewire the wing’s new F-4D Phantoms to fire the 
Sidewinder instead.102  Disgusted with their missiles, some F-4 pilots clamored for guns in hopes 
of engaging with a weapon that worked.103    
Exacerbating the missile issues were those with the Phantom itself.  The avionics, which 
had worked well in the more temperate climates of Europe and North America, regularly 
malfunctioned in the damp of Southeast Asia.  When the radar did work, it had difficulty 
detecting the low-flying MiGs or differentiating between friendly and enemy aircraft.  This made 
use of the Sparrow rather problematic.  Exacerbating this problem, McDonnell Douglas’s 
engineers had decided to optimize ease of manufacture rather than maintenance or operation 
when laying out the cockpit controls.104  It was not unheard of for Air Force F-4s to enter combat 
with radios that did not work due to the difficulty of performing maintenance on them or for 
crews to be unable to switch to the correct weapons system during the high-g turns common to 
air combat.105
The F-4’s issues as an air superiority fighter continued when one considered its external 
structure.  The Phantom, already at a disadvantage due to its very large size compared to the 
North Vietnamese MiGs, was further handicapped by the fact that its two J-79 engines smoked 
profusely unless the engine was in idle or the fuel-guzzling afterburner was ignited.106  This 
meant that, even beyond the inherent advantage given to them by their GCI, North Vietnamese 
fighter pilots could see the F-4 before being seen themselves or, in some cases, outside the 
maximum range of the F-4’s radar.107  Lastly, and most ominously, once Phantom pilots began 
actually pushing their fighters, the F-4 displayed a disturbing tendency to go into a stall and spin 
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sequence.108  Called either “departure” or “adverse yaw,” if this occurred below 10,000 feet 
recovery was difficult if not impossible.  Although increased training and familiarity with the 
aircraft decreased the odds that a crew would find themselves spinning out of control, it was easy 
to press the aircraft too far when engaged in combat with MiGs.   
The Phantom’s virtues, in the hands of a well-trained pilot, made up for many of its 
vices.  However, the U.S. Air Force’s own policies tended to minimize the former and 
exacerbate the latter.  Even after Rolling Thunder’s initial engagements served notice that the 
demise of traditional fighter combat was not quite at hand, the Air Force made no attempt to 
change its method of training air-to-air combat throughout Rolling Thunder.  Furthermore, Air 
Force leaders made few attempts to determine the reasons behind the success of units such as 
Robin Olds’ 8th TFW.109  Nor, despite the fact that it placed the F-4s at a disadvantage, did 7th 
Air Force stop the process of making most Phantoms carry bombs into combat rather than 
allowing them to enter combat carrying only fuel and air-to-air missiles.110  When carrying the 
extra weight of bombs, F-4s had to fly much slower speeds and lower throttle settings in order to 
conserve fuel.  This gave MiGs an initial speed advantage during their attack and, given that the 
Phantoms usually had to jettison these weapons prior to engaging the North Vietnamese fighters, 
a head start in making their escape.  In the thick haze, smoke, and ground clutter over North 
Vietnam, this advantage was often all that was needed for NVAF interceptors to escape pursuit.   
Experienced fighter pilots may have been able to overcome 7th Air Force’s insistence that 
F-4s carry bombs, developed the techniques that were not taught in training, or become strong 
enough leaders that men such as Olds were not as missed.  This process was prevented by the Air 
Force’s questionable personnel policies.  After 100 missions, pilots were rotated to non-combat 
postings in either Europe or the United States.  In an attempt at “fairness,” the Air Force ensured 
 60
that these men were replaced with pilots who had not faced combat yet.111  Initially these were 
other TAC pilots, but as Rolling Thunder continued the other flying commands were 
increasingly forced to provide pilots that were sent to a replacement training unit (RTU), given a 
short transition course in the F-4 (or the F-105 for strike pilots), then given orders to Southeast 
Asia.112  Although not necessarily fodder, the majority of these men lacked the mentality or 
aptitude to fly powerful fighters in combat.  In addition, the difference in attitudes between their 
former communities and the one which the Air Force’s personnel policy thrust them often had a 
negative effect on unit cohesion.113  Many of these pilots were able to overcome their initial 
shortcomings as they progressed in their tours, but in the interim their inexperience had a 
negative effect on the Air Force’s combat capability. 
The State of the Air Force, November 1968 
 
This problem with manning was only one of the numerous issues facing the Air Force as 
Rolling Thunder ended in November 1968.   First and foremost, it was clear that USAF leaders 
had wildly exaggerated the likelihood of nuclear war when writing the service’s doctrine.  
Second, the severe cost of Rolling Thunder had indicated that the Air Force’s views on hostile 
air defense systems were fatally flawed.  The NV-IADS had not only taken its measure of 7th Air 
Force but it had also shot down so many Thunderchiefs that the Air Force was forced to 
withdrawal the F-105D from active service.114  Third, conventional training and pilot proficiency 
had been clearly lacking at the beginning of Rolling Thunder.  The ensuing combat operations 
had almost reversed this problem by 1968 yet few could argue that the cost had been exorbitant.  
Finally, the psychological effect of these devastating losses, frustration with what the pilots 
perceived as indifference of Air Force leaders and wide availability of jobs in the civilian sector 
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resulted in many combat-experienced pilots opting for civilian life.115  This exodus occurred 
concurrently with the accelerated exit of the World War II and Korean War pilots who had led 
Rolling Thunder’s squadrons and wings.  With most of the experienced officers leaving, the Air 
Force was in great danger of losing most of the lessons it had learned from Operation Rolling 
Thunder.116   
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CHAPTER 4 - Between Thunder and a Linebacker 
The Air Force’s leaders had limited options with which to prevent the loss of knowledge 
gained from 1965 to 1968.  First, there was the option of preventing experienced pilots from 
leaving the service.  There are no indications that senior military leaders considered this drastic 
step and, even if they had, the legality of it would have been in question.  A second option was to 
begin an oral history and interview program that attempted to record the thoughts of all of the 
former combat officers.  General McConnell began such a program (initially called LOYAL 
LOOK but later dubbed CORONA HARVEST), but time and constrained resources limited its 
effect.1
The final option available to General McConnell and the Air Force was to update its 
doctrine.  The Air Staff had begun this process prior to Operation Rolling Thunder.2  Indeed, one 
of McConnell’s first acts as Chief of Staff had been to circulate an almost prescient 
memorandum on the need for the Air Force to revise its views on air superiority.3  However, 
operations over North Vietnam had absorbed a great deal of the Air Force’s institutional and 
intellectual energy.  This absorption, in turn, had resulted in the stagnation of doctrinal 
development.      
SEAD Doctrine, 1968 through 1972 
 
Ideally, this torpid state of doctrine development should have been a blessing in disguise 
for the Air Force.  With both a large number of experienced officers as well as guidance clearly 
in need of revision, the Air Force should have been poised to make a radical doctrinal advance.  
This did not occur.  Instead, USAF, from 1968 to 1972, did little to increase its conventional 
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capability in general and almost nothing to change its SEAD capability.  Lacking the pervasive 
guidance of doctrine, the Air Force made few advances with regard to fixing the vulnerabilities 
exposed by the NV-IADS during Rolling Thunder.  The changes made to training, equipment, 
and procurement policies were minimal and, for the most part, had little effect on the ability to 
destroy an NV-IADS.  There is little evidence that USAF leaders at any level attempted to 
determine how Air Force units were to identify or destroy an IADS’s command and control 
elements.  With regard to AAA, from 1968 to 1972 the Air Force continued to preach the gospel 
of terrain avoidance and low-level ingress and egress rather than concentrating solely on the far 
safer medium-altitude ingress followed by dive-bombing delivery.4  This was a clear indication 
that USAF leaders’ views on the effectiveness of AAA against modern jet aircraft were still in 
flux even though Operation Rolling Thunder had provided overwhelming evidence in the 
affirmative.5
Anti-radar efforts faced a similar organizational malaise.  In addition to its Rolling 
Thunder experience, USAF was also able to observe the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF’s) issues in 
facing Egyptian defenses from late 1967 on.6  Despite this, there were minimal advances in anti-
radar capability, either through ECM or through physical attack.  The EB-66, despite its creeping 
obsolescence, continued to be the primary jamming aircraft.  As for Wild Weasels, USAF once 
again attempted to use an obsolescent airframe (the F-4C) rather than attempt to develop a 
wholly new system or diverting new Phantom production for modification.  In addition to not 
being able to carry StARMs, the F-4C had serious issues with regard to its avionics suite.7  These 
proved difficult to resolve and, as the Air Force gave little priority to this task, the Wild Weasel 
IV was not ready for combat prior to October 1972.8   
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The sum effect of these changes was that the Air Force aircraft went to war in 1972 with 
less electronic warfare capability than it had when Operation Rolling Thunder ended.  On the 
positive side, the ability to carry more StARMs, better jammers, minor improvements in avionics, 
and an increase in the total available airframes meant that Wild Weasels were somewhat more 
capable.  This increase in capability, however, was more than counterbalanced by the increased 
proficiency of the North Vietnamese, the F-105F/G’s age, the Thunderchiefs’ lower speed at 
medium altitude, and the need for Wild Weasels to be provided with an additional flight of 
escorts.  Whether or not one believes that the Air Force’s anti-radar capability actually regressed, 
there is overwhelming evidence that markedly improving Wild Weasel capability had not been a 
priority of the intervening four years.9
The Air Force appeared similarly disinterested in making major improvements in its 
ability to destroy airborne MiGs.  Despite the heavy losses suffered from NVAF interceptors, 
especially in the final months of Rolling Thunder, the Air Force did not increase its focus on 
ACM.  Instead, the number of aerial combat training flights flown by new pilots actually 
decreased.10  Even worse, those missions which were left in the syllabus did not include 
dissimilar training, but instead were the same rigidly controlled exercises that had passed for 
training prior to Rolling Thunder.11  Rather than learning how to use their Phantoms’ strengths 
against an enemy’s weaknesses, new pilots were often sent to war with only a rudimentary 
understanding of their fighters’ capabilities.12    
This lack of training made the improvements the Air Force made to the Phantom itself 
superfluous.  Equipping the “E” model of the Phantom with a gun did little good if no one taught 
the pilots flying the fighter how to bring their cannon to bear.  Improved avionics and 
ergonomically modified cockpits had little effect if the Air Force did not ensure that pilots 
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received the number of training sorties to make their use second nature.  When TAC did not 
develop a training regimen that instructed pilots on how to fly an F-4 throughout its flight 
regime, expecting these same pilots to take advantage of maneuvering slats that were designed to 
improve the Phantom’s performance in air-to-air combat was somewhat wishful thinking.  
Finally, the continued problems with the Sparrow and Sidewinder meant that the F-4s’ primary 
armament remained ineffective.13
SEAD doctrine was not a panacea for all of these issues.  However, it is clear that, in its 
absence, the Air Force continued most of the same policies that had caused the heavy losses 
during Operation Rolling Thunder.  From the lack of movement on SEAD doctrine, equipment, 
or training from 1968 through 1972, it appeared that Air Force leaders focused on the wrong 
issues after rolling Thunder.  Although, as noted by Air Force historian Michael Worden, “TAC 
worked closely with Systems Command to develop cluster-bomb munitions (CBU), precision-
guided munitions (PGM), radar warning systems…F-4E gatling guns…electronic warfare 
aircraft, and long-range aid to navigation (LORAN) systems,” the majority of these efforts were 
conducted without thought to their integration with each other.14  For almost four years the Air 
Force, in focusing on individual aircraft components and ordnance effects on targets, did not 
apply a great deal of effort in determining how their pilots would get to their objectives through 
an integrated air defense system. 
Thoughts on Air Defense 
 
Noting the Air Force’s lack of SEAD doctrine is not intended to imply that the 1971 
edition of AFM 1-1 completely ignored the enemy air defenses.  Indeed, if the Air Force had not 
just spent three years being mauled over North Vietnam, its treatment of a possible enemy IADS 
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would have appeared to be sufficient given the dearth of other information for analysis.  At the 
tactical level, the Air Force’s revised doctrinal manual provided a doctrine of what the 
“counterair mission” consisted of [bold in original copy]: 
3-4. Conventional Mission Characteristics. In a conflict involving only 
conventional weapons, the following mission characteristics will generally apply:  
 
a. The Counterair Mission. Conventional operations require the use of 
aircraft of such a scale as to be impracticable without air superiority. The 
counterair mission can best be accomplished by multiple attacks against the 
enemy’s airbases, air order of battle, and his command and control facilities, but 
must also include the interception and destruction of enemy aircraft in flight. If 
sanctuary is permitted near the battle zone, air superiority will depend on air-to-
air combat.15
 
 
This tactical definition complemented the counterair operational task [bold in original 
copy]:  
a. Counterair. Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air 
superiority by destruction or neutralization of an enemy’s offensive and defensive 
air capability. The counterair mission involves both offensive and defensive air 
action. 
 
(1) Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy 
territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and 
anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, fuel stores and other 
elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. 
 
(2) Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. 
Air defense operations involve destroying enemy air vehicles attempting to 
penetrate friendly air space. While air defense is vital to the overall counterair 
program and to the security of friendly forces and installations, the most rapid and 
conclusive results are obtained through offensive action. 
 
(3) Centralized allocation and direction of air forces is essential to achieve 
maximum effectiveness of the counterair effort and to insure coordination of the 
overall air campaign.16
 
In order to accomplish these tasks, according to AFM 1-1, aerospace forces would have 
to be “capable of”: 
 
(1) Sustained operations under austere conditions. 
 
(2) Continuous mission performance under all conditions of light and weather. 
 
(3) Continued and effective operations in a sophisticated enemy 
electromagnetic environment. 
 
(4) Survivability under enemy fire. 
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(5) Obtaining complete and timely intelligence on enemy activities. 
 
b. Underlying the foregoing capabilities is the requirement for a secure, 
responsive, flexible control system to direct the forces, integrate their efforts, and 
coordinate operations with those of other friendly forces.  
 
c. Standardized equipment, ordnance, and operational procedures are 
desirable, however, efforts to standardize should not compromise mission 
flexibility nor create stereotyped operational patterns. 
 
d. Combat aircraft are designed to accomplish specific operational tasks. At 
the same time to achieve flexibility, combat aircraft are capable of performing 
multiple missions.17
 
 
Finally, the ordnance which these aircraft would carry would meet the following 
description [bold in original text]: 
3-3. Conventional Weapons Capabilities. Conventional weapon capabilities 
should not be considered as fixed or static. Since military capability is sensitive to 
new types of weapons and improved delivery systems, efforts to upgrade 
conventional systems must proceed alongside comparable efforts in the field of 
nuclear warfare. Smoke, incendiary agents and riot control agents are included 
within the concept of conventional air operations. 
 
These descriptions and analysis would have been suitable if written in 1965.  However, 
when compared to descriptions of operations over North Vietnam and the stated national policy 
of the Nixon Administration, they were far from adequate.  The Air Force was tasked with 
multiple worldwide missions, and Air Force leaders repeatedly emphasized that a potential war 
in Central Europe was their paradigm for measuring effectiveness and contingency planning.18  
AFM 1-1’s authors wrote the above paragraphs as if many of these contingencies would not 
entail fighting the very same systems that had just savaged 7th Air Force over the DRV.  Indeed, 
by looking at AFM 1-1 an outside observer would have believed that an individual AAA site was 
as worthwhile a target as fuel stores for a major air base.  If one accepts that the purpose of 
doctrine is to provide clear guidelines, AFM 1-1 did not meet this standard with regard to SEAD. 
This shortcoming did not end with target prioritization.  Based on the document’s own 
definitions, it was impossible for a theater commander to organize an effective SEAD aerospace 
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force from systems available in 1971.  With only limited capability to operate at night, 
marginally better suitability to operations in an electronic environment, and no innate 
reconnaissance capabilities, the F-4 airframe did not even meet most of the criteria for aerospace 
power in the document.  Thus, commanders expected to carry out SEAD would not be able to 
employ the proposed Wild Weasel IV aircraft against ground-based threats even as the document 
was being written, much less in the near future.  This dissonance becomes even more 
pronounced when one considers that the F-105 F/G, not the F-4C, was still USAF’s primary 
suppression aircraft in September 1971. 
This dissonance between doctrinally stated requirements and existing Air Force 
capabilities in 1971 continues with regard to conventional weapons.  Although AFM 1-1 alludes 
to conventional weapons, there is no mention of what these weapons are expected to do to 
targets.  SEAD weapons are not even described in general.  As doctrine should drive 
procurement, this is a curious omission.  The Air Force had learned through painful experience 
over North Vietnam that not all conventional weapons were created equal.  Although having the 
central doctrinal text list every weapon by type would be unwieldy, having a general description 
of what each type of weapon should be capable of in the service of aerospace power could have 
been accomplished in a short number of pages.  The Air Force’s doctrinal writers did not do this 
and, in addition to leading to later weapons procurement mischief, this omission increased the 
likelihood that the bomber, fighter, and electronic warfare communities would suffer confusion 
when communicating with one another. 
Finally, AFM 1-1 continued the tie Air Force conventional and nuclear capabilities 
together as part of a warfighting whole.  Tying conventional capabilities to nuclear 
advancements (see para. 3-3 above) did not make much sense.  The Soviet Union’s 
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advancements in nuclear weapons by 1971 greatly decreased the likelihood that a nuclear 
exchange would occur.  Simultaneously, this paradigm increased the probability of a 
conventional conflict.  By stating that R&D efforts for both had to be “comparable,” USAF 
leaders indicated their belief both that thermonuclear exchange continued to be a viable national 
strategy and, in addition, that conventional weapons should not be given primacy of place in 
future Air Force plans regardless of the increased likelihood of their use.  Further evidence of 
this mindset can be seen in the fact that conventional weapons operations are covered in one 
chapter, yet AFM 1-1 dedicated two chapters to nuclear warfare.  Although it was feasible that 
there could be low-intensity as well as high-intensity nuclear conflict in 1971, the Air Force had 
not used a single nuclear bomb in combat throughout its entire existence.  Therefore, the 
devotion of so much space to this topic in AFM 1-1 is somewhat puzzling when the Air Force 
had fought at least six years of mid-intensity conflicts and continued to support a low-intensity 
counterinsurgency in South Vietnam.19   
Even harder to understand is why the Air Force included these two chapters yet did not 
include one on SEAD.  North Vietnam’s air defenses had accounted for the downing of almost 
1,000 aircraft using obsolescent systems.  The Air Force was well aware that the Soviet Union 
possessed far more capable systems.  Even excluding the primacy of the Central European 
scenario in USAF war planning, Air Force leaders and pilots were well aware of the Soviet 
Union’s willingness to provide advanced systems to client states.20  Despite this knowledge, 
AFM 1-1’s writers saw fit to provide only three paragraphs on this threat.  With regard to 
discussion on how Air Force pilots would go about defanging future threats, the doctrine 
published in September 1971 was fundamentally the same as that published in 1953.   
Explaining the Excluded 
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 No single event explains why Air Force SEAD doctrine did not evolve from 1968 to 
1972.  The Air Force remained a large organization and, like all similar entities, had many 
complexities and interactions that usually prevented any one person from greatly influencing its 
doctrinal development.  However, historical evidence indicates that there were three major 
incidents that influenced the development of AFM 1-1 in general and the exclusion of SEAD 
doctrine in particular.  First, the election of Richard Nixon and appointment of his cabinet not 
only changed the Air Force’s civilian leadership in 1968 but revamped USAF’s strategic focus 
yet again.  The 1969 appointment of General John D. Ryan to succeed General McConnell as Air 
Force Chief of Staff meant that this reorientation occurred in a period when military leadership 
was also transitioning.  Finally, in yet another shift, General McConnell appointed General 
William Momyer to become head of Tactical Air Command.  Having all three of these positions 
change hands simultaneously had interesting effects on Air Force doctrine. 
President Nixon, in addition to wanting to end the Vietnam War, also sought to shift 
American military responsibilities.  The Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization were merely the 
conventional portions of this plan.  As part of the larger U.S. military framework, Nixon sought 
to reduce tension with the Soviet Union and exploit the increasing acrimony with that nation and 
the People’s Republic of China.  In addition to believing that this would help the United States 
extricate itself from Vietnam, President Nixon believed that this would have the effect of 
reducing the military budget.21  Nixon may not have understood what was needed to enact the 
Nixon Doctrine, but his intentions were quite apparent soon after he took office.   
No matter how bluntly Nixon put things, however, the President was hamstrung by his 
frosty relationship with Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.  Laird had not been Nixon’s first 
choice to head DoD and, as the President did not know him well, did not enjoy the Chief 
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Executive’s full confidence.22  As would be the case with many others, this lack of trust led 
Nixon to regard Laird with increasing acrimony and paranoia.  Laird’s actions during a crisis 
with North Korea followed shortly by Nixon’s suspicions that his Secretary of Defense was the 
source of the leak regarding operations in Cambodia did not help matters.23  Eventually, the 
friction between the two men grew to the point that their relationship was barely functional, as 
Nixon began to believe that Laird was more interested in simply abandoning South Vietnam than 
achieving any semblance of victory.24  Although a degree of tension between a President and his 
Secretary of Defense in time of war may be normal or even healthy, the relationship between 
Nixon and Laird exceeded this standard.  This friction, combined with the damage done to the 
Department of Defense by the Johnson Administration, prevented Laird from acting as Nixon’s 
agent of change within the Department of Defense. 
In contrast to Laird and Nixon, the problem with the association between Secretary of the 
Air Force Robert Seamans, Jr. and General Ryan was that it was too friendly.  Air historian 
Walter J. Boyne describes Seamans as “able” and an “excellent match” for General Ryan when 
the latter became Air Force Chief of Staff.25  If one accepts that the Air Force needed change, it 
stands to reason that this was not a good thing.  Furthermore, Seamans not only established the 
Air Force’s Central European focus but also gave every indication that the Air Force’s leaders 
did not have to worry about a return to North Vietnam.26  With this lackadaisical approach to 
solving the war at hand, Seamans likely contributed to, as Earl Tilford puts it, the “sense within 
the Air Force that the [Vietnam] war was over” in 1971.27  Finally, there are no indications that 
Seamans questioned the Air Force’s continued attempt to develop a successor to the B-52 or, 
given the Nixon Doctrine, why continued strategic upgrades should have priority over upgrading 
the conventional fighting force.28  Taken altogether, these actions strongly indicate that Secretary 
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Seamans, regardless of the extent of his knowledge about the Air Force or what had occurred 
during Operation Rolling Thunder, was not interested in forcing major modifications to doctrine 
on the Air Force’s military leadership.    
Air Force Leaders 
 
That impetus for sweeping changes would have to come from an external source is 
apparent from examining the three Air Force officers who were responsible for conventional 
readiness prior to Operation Linebacker.  The first of these, General McConnell, was only briefly 
upon the scene.  Having served as Air Force Chief of Staff for the entirety of Rolling Thunder, 
McConnell blamed most of that campaign’s shortcomings on civilian leaders’ restrictions.29  
Furthermore, McConnell felt that the Air Force had allowed its strategic strength to decline to 
dangerous levels.30  Although he had cut SAC’s research and development budget to the bone in 
order to support tactical fighters in contact, McConnell had also strongly resisted cutting 
prohibitively expensive bomber programs in order to expedite the production of conventional 
fighters.31  It was clear that General McConnell believed the Air Force should reallocate the bulk 
of its budget from conventional operations to rebuilding SAC as soon as the Vietnam War was 
over.  It is not hard to imagine how the Chief of Staff’s views may have influenced doctrine 
writers in general and, given that McConnell gave little indication that he believed suppressing 
enemy air defenses was a key task, with regard to SEAD in particular. 
General John D. Ryan, McConnell’s successor, believed even more strongly in the 
primacy of strategic forces.  General McConnell, desiring Ryan to be his successor, had 
appointed the latter as Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces at the beginning of Operation 
Rolling Thunder.  McConnell had done this specifically so that Ryan, who had spent his entire 
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career within SAC, could gain some experience overseeing tactical fighters.  This appointment 
did not go well.  First, General Ryan regularly demonstrated ignorance of what his pilots were 
going through and gave few indications that he wished to learn.32  Second, he displayed a very 
poor leadership style which often prevented the flow of information between PACAF and 7th Air 
Force and also had a negative impact on pilots’ morale.  Finally, on more than one occasion he 
seemingly demonstrated a lack of integrity to his subordinates.33
Had Ryan not become Air Force Chief of Staff, these personality traits would not have 
had much bearing on how USAF developed doctrine.  However, General Ryan carried these 
same traits to Washington when he succeeded McConnell.  Two incidents will suffice to 
illustrate this point.  First, after tacitly encouraging 7th Air Force commander General John D. 
Lavelle to interpret liberally his rules of engagement with regard to striking North Vietnamese 
targets in 1971, Ryan did not defend his subordinate when these incidents drew the ire of 
President Nixon.34  Second, after having dispatched then Brigadier General Robin Olds to 
conduct an evaluation of 7th Air Force’s capabilities, General Ryan did not reward the World 
War II ace and MiG killer for his candor.  Instead, General Olds was shuffled off to the Air 
Force Inspector General’s office, effectively ending his career.35  Justifiably or not, General 
Ryan began to develop a reputation for not wanting to hear bad news or have subordinates 
confront him in public.36  Although the effect this environment had on doctrinal development 
cannot be quantified, it is unlikely that it was positive. 
The last Air Force leader who, by virtue of position and experience, could have had a 
great influence on Air Force doctrine was General William Momyer, commander of TAC.  Of all 
three military leaders, it is General Momyer’s unwillingness to force change that is hardest to 
explain.  The commander of 7th Air Force throughout Rolling Thunder, Momyer had been an 
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approachable leader who often visited his wing commanders.37  Unlike Ryan at PACAF, 
Momyer had been well aware of the NV-IADS’s effect on his forces.  In response to the strength 
of the DRV’s defenses, General Momyer had regularly scheduled tactics meetings involving all 
of his subordinate leaders then disseminated the collective input throughout his organization.38  
When General McConnell appointed Momyer as head of TAC, it was with the understanding 
that the latter would bring these same techniques with him to his new posting.  General Ryan 
reaffirmed this expectation when he succeeded McConnell as Chief of Staff.39  Therefore, it is 
hard to understand why General Momyer did not ensure that AFM 1-1 encapsulated more of the 
lessons, to include the necessity for SEAD, which 7th Air Force had learned. 
 One possible cause could be combat fatigue, as Momyer had overseen the longest 
bombing campaign in the Air Force’s short history while simultaneously running the air war over 
South Vietnam.  Another is that Momyer may have believed that the Air Force, and he, had 
executed Rolling Thunder to the best of their ability given the resources at hand and civilian 
restrictions in place.  Momyer espouses this view throughout his book Air power In Three Wars 
and it is hard to believe that this opinion did not affect his actions as TAC commander.  
Providing further evidence that this stance may have been a factor is a 1974 memorandum that 
accompanied the CORONA HARVEST report on operations over North Vietnam and Laos 
during Rolling Thunder.  In it, Momyer states: 
 
Many of the restrictions on the attack of SAMs and AAA came from the location 
of these weapons.  The North Vietnamese deliberately sited many of these 
weapons in civilian areas knowing full well there would be a reluctance to strike 
these sites because of the civilian casualties that would ensue.  The question of 
expected collateral damage became a major consideration in the selection of 
targets at the highest level.  The SAMs and AAA that were located in the ten and 
thirty mile circle were usually surrounded by civilian structures.  Collateral 
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damage could be significant when striking these targets which invariably had a 
political effect on the international scene.40   
 
Momyer proceeds to give a similar treatment to air-to-air combat during Rolling 
Thunder: 
With the projected weapon systems now being developed and procured, 
[emphasis added] we should have a vastly improved potential for air to air 
combat.  Although the air to air engagements were dramatic in the Vietnam War, 
they were of limited significance [emphasis added] in terms of operations against 
the warmaking structure of the North Vietnamese.  The MiG force was relatively 
small and the size of the engagements was limited to four to five aircraft at any 
given time.  Even under the intensive effort by the North Vietnamese, the number 
of MiGs up for battle never exceeded fifteen to twenty aircraft.  We should, 
therefore, be cautious about the lessons derived from these limited combats.  Most 
certainly, relative performance of aircraft could be judged and restricted 
conclusions on air to air tactics could be deduced, but one should not try to 
extrapolate these limited experiences in generalizing about the character of an air 
war in Europe where thousands of fighters would be involved. 
 
Recommendation.  Current actions are considered adequate [emphasis added].  
Care should be exercised in the application of the Vietnam experience to our 
tactical operations manuals.  TAC should be directed to review such publications 
for applicability to a large scale war.41   
 
Considering that General Momyer wrote this in 1974, i.e., two years after the Linebacker 
Operations, it is safe to assume that Momyer had these same opinions from 1968 to 1972.  This 
means that, in Momyer’s view, it was not the Air Force’s current doctrine or its lack of guidance 
that explained 7th Air Force’s inability to combat the NV-IADS.  Nor was it USAF’s inability to 
reliably detect active Fan Song and Fire Can radars, lack of a suitable ARM or conventional 
munitions to destroy SAM sites, or lack of pilot training in the delivery of these weapons that 
explained the resiliency of North Vietnam’s defenses.   
Instead, in Momyer’s view it was the DRV’s cunning use of civilian structures coupled 
with President Johnson and Secretary McNamara’s unwillingness to suffer a loss of international 
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prestige that explained 7th Air Force’s issues with ground defenses.  Likewise, the missiles that 
had failed to work reliably in Rolling Thunder had done so, in part, due to a lack of a target-rich 
environment or high-altitude clash between droves of MiGs and squadrons of Phantoms.  
Finally, as long as the Air Force could wait until new systems were produced, there was no need 
to change training or ensure that pilots knew how to use their high-technology mounts once they 
began to arrive in the Air Force.   
Combined, these factors meant that TAC, like the remainder of the Air Force, marked 
time and focused on attempting to mitigate the damage Operation Rolling Thunder had caused.  
Although Momyer did make several changes, the majority of these did not require strenuous 
action or risk taking on his part.  By emphasizing that TAC focus on the development of guided 
bombs, all-weather capability, and sensor systems, General Momyer ensured that USAF’s next 
generation of warriors would go to war with the ability to threaten an ever growing list of 
targets.42  Unfortunately for the generation he commanded, however, the North Vietnamese did 
not wait until these projects came to full fruition.  When the Easter Offensive broke, USAF’s 
tactical fighters once again went to war with a focus on what would happen once a strike group 
reached a target but little idea of how to get there.
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CHAPTER 5 - The Linebacker Operations 
The North Vietnamese offensive was, in many ways, the first chance to test the Nixon 
Doctrine.  President Nixon, true to his word, relied on American air power to support an ally’s 
ground forces in resistance to Communist aggression.  Unlike his predecessor, President Nixon 
released these forces with reasonably clear strategic goals and the will to accomplish them.  The 
North Vietnamese, in response to this onslaught, defended their country with the same systems 
they had from 1965 to 1968.  Beginning with Operation Freedom Train, transitioning seamlessly 
to Linebacker I and then, after a two-month pause (October through November 1972), ending 
with Linebacker II, the United States Navy and Air Force once again put America’s air power 
theories to the test. 
Measuring Effectiveness 
 
There are many opinions on the outcome of this test.  Many of these judgments depend 
on how one views the ultimate objectives.  As one Air Force historian has noted, a football 
linebacker disrupts the offense through speed, strength, and the application of controlled 
violence.1  Although urban legend has it that Linebacker I was so dubbed “because of [President 
Nixon’s] fondness for football,” the moniker was an apt allegory given American intentions to 
disrupt North Vietnam’s strategic war aims from 30 March to 23 October, 1972.2  However, as 
disruption is a vague term, clearly enumerating President Nixon’s objectives will better serve 
further discussion.  Generally speaking, the Air Force and USN were dispatched to accomplish 
the following objectives: 
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1. Interdict the NVA’s supply lines in order to prevent the success of the Easter Offensive; 
 
2. Sufficiently punish North Vietnam, both by destroying its military capability and civilian 
infrastructure, that its leadership was both compelled to accept American peace terms and 
deterred from future aggression;3 
 
3. Validate USAF and USN’s ability to conduct conventional operations in a high-threat air 
defense environment; 
 
4. If USAF introduced strategic bombers, all elements were to ensure that the deterrent 
value of the manned strategic bomber was preserved. 
   
Goal #1: Battlefield Interdiction 
 
 
The first two tasks were clearly and repeatedly stated by President Nixon.  By deploying 
the North Vietnamese Army in a modern combined-arms mechanized assault the Politburo had 
made their forces vulnerable to a traditional aerial interdiction campaign.  If DRV’s leaders had 
been correct in their analysis of Nixon, this vulnerability would have been of no consequence—
South Vietnam did not have an Air Force capable of many operations beyond close-air support.  
However, when his military leaders made clear to Nixon the extent and type of the North’s 
attack, the President made several clear comparisons to the North Vietnamese offensive and the 
Wehrmacht’s Ardennes Offensive of December 1944.  Equally direct were his indications that he 
expected the North Vietnamese offensive to suffer a similar fate as that of the German one: 
strangulation and destruction under the weight of American air power.4
Whether or not air power caused the NVA’s offensive to fail is arguable even as its 
importance is not.  On one hand, the Linebacker strikes wrought great destruction on the North 
Vietnamese logistical network through the destruction of bridges, railways, and supply caches 
throughout that country.5  On the other, the NVA had foreseen just this possibility and stockpiled 
sufficient supplies to conduct the initial phase of their offensive.6  This simple preparation meant 
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that any interdiction campaign, no matter how rapid, would have taken several weeks to show 
any effect.   
The massive amounts of air power directed against the NVA’s offensive forces, however, 
ensured that the exposed North Vietnamese divisions suffered losses far exceeding what their 
leaders had prepared for.  With a myriad number of aircraft, to include everything from U.S. 
Army A-1 helicopter gunships through South Vietnamese A-1 Skyraiders up to B-52 Arc Light 
missions dropping 60,000-180,000 pounds of high explosive every thirty minutes, the NVA’s 
armored spearheads faced firepower unlike any seen to that point in warfare.  As Nixon desired, 
this resulted in the defeat of the North Vietnamese offensive in conjunction with the interdiction 
campaign.  Regardless of which phase caused more damage, the NVA’s general offensive did 
not achieve the conquest of the South and thus USAF and USN met President Nixon’s goal.7
Goal #2: Punishment 
 
The military could not so easily meet the second objective to punish North Vietnam.  
From Nixon’s perspective, the DRV’s Politburo had rewarded three years of good faith 
negotiating with an overt, aggressive betrayal.  Moreover, North Vietnam’s actions threatened to 
undermine Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s Cold War détente policies 
with the People’s Republic of China and Soviet Union.  Additionally, Nixon had watched his 
predecessor attempt a gradual campaign that had been a spectacular failure.  Finally, and most 
importantly, Nixon wanted to make certain that the North Vietnamese were keenly aware of the 
penalties involved should the DRV force the United States to again intervene in Southeast Asia.  
All four of these factors compelled Nixon to ensure the military understood his intent for the 
Linebacker operations to be an act of violence so extreme as to deter any future large-scale North 
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Vietnamese offensives against South Vietnam for at least the remainder of his term.  Nixon, 
contrary to what the DRV’s Politburo had expected, had the will to aid South Vietnam.  Even 
worse, as they were about to be made aware, the American President had the necessary 
vindictiveness to ruin North Vietnam’s civil and industrial capability if this would result in the 
DRV’s leadership being cowed into giving South Vietnam breathing room.8
It is unknown whether what Nixon asked of the American military was even achievable.  
Like President Johnson’s goal of demonstrating “resolve,” Nixon’s desire to “punish” the North 
Vietnamese cannot be quantified.  The DRV’s Politburo was highly motivated to expedite the 
United States’ exit, as they felt this was the only way to ensure the fall of South Vietnam.  After 
the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, some observers noticed that North Vietnamese Politburo 
members increasingly focused on their own mortality.  Ho Chi Minh’s death similarly stoked the 
North Vietnamese people’s desire to reunite their country.9  Combined, these two factors meant 
that it is unlikely that the United States could achieve a sufficient level of violence to persuade 
these men to accept a divided Vietnam or, for that matter, any dictated American objectives.  
That Nixon’s goals kept changing not only hindered this process, but also had a negative effect 
on just how much and what type of pain USAF and USN needed to inflict.10   
Regardless of these facts, one possible guideline does exist: Operation Rolling Thunder.  
The North Vietnamese people and leadership had weathered USAF and USN’s efforts from 1965 
to 1968.  Considering North Vietnam’s continued intransigence from 1968 to 1972, infiltration 
of NVA regular units into South Vietnam, and the launch of the Easter Offensive, Operation 
Rolling Thunder had not greatly affected the DRV’s society nor deterred its leaders.  Therefore, 
in order to have achieved Nixon’s “punishment,” the Linebacker operations would have had to at 
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least equal if not surpass that earlier effort.  This did not occur, and the primary reason was the 
continued strength of the NV-IADS and the inadequacy of Air Force SEAD doctrine.   
It is necessary to examine some factors before the impact from a lack of SEAD doctrine 
becomes apparent.  In 1972, USAF did not deploy as many aircraft to Southeast Asia as it had in 
1968.  During Linebacker Operations, 7th Air Force had roughly 100 fewer aircraft capable of 
striking Vietnam that its Rolling Thunder predecessor.11  The material quality of this force, 
however, was far greater.  During operations from April to October, 7th Air Force’s primary 
strike aircraft was the F-4 Phantom, each of which was capable of carrying slightly more tonnage 
than the F-105.  More importantly, the Air Force had developed the Paveway (laser) and GBU / 
HOBO (optical or EOGB) families of guided weapons.  In clear conditions, both of these 
systems allowed the F-4 to engage targets that had been previous unassailable due to their 
proximity to urban centers or sensitive buildings.  In addition, they allowed the rapid destruction 
of bridges, bunkers, and other hardened North Vietnamese structures.  The General Dynamics F-
111, the end result of Secretary McNamara’s TFX program, provided an all-weather, night-
attack capability from September 1972 forward.12   
Taken altogether, these new capabilities meant that General John W. Vogt, 7th Air 
Force’s commander, possessed a far deadlier force than General Momyer had.  When one added 
SAC’s B-52s, first used in April 1972 and fully committed in December 1972, USAF seemingly 
had more than enough firepower to break the will of the North Vietnamese people and their 
leaders.13  Contrary to the claims of some authors, this did not happen and, thus, USAF did not 
achieve its second objective.  The reason for this shortcoming was directly attributable to the 
strength of the NV-IADS and thus stemmed from the Air Force’s inattention to SEAD doctrine 
between Operation Rolling Thunder and the start of Linebacker operations.   
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The amount of impact a lack of SEAD doctrine had on the first phase of Linebacker 
operations stemmed from the increased capabilities 7th Air Force possessed.  A typical LGB 
strike began with an F-4 flight arriving in the vicinity of the targeted structure armed with three 
aircraft carrying Paveway bombs and one aircraft (usually the flight leader) equipped with a 
Pave Knife laser pod.14  This pod was an improvement on an earlier system that had required the 
designating aircraft to remain in a gentle, predictable orbit while other aircraft dropped bombs.  
When in the target area, the flight leader would designate the strike’s objective and, on his 
signal, the entire flight would drop the allocated number of Paveways on the target.  The control 
units on these bombs then detected the light reflected from the Pave Knife’s laser and guided the 
ordnance to impact.15   
EOGB operations were somewhat similar to those of LGBs.  Once again, a flight of F-4s 
approached a target area at medium altitude.  Upon acquiring the objective, the F-4’s backseater 
would acquire the desired target visually.  The Phantom’s pilot would then bring the aircraft into 
the correct attitude, altitude, and air speed to release the glide bomb as the backseater attempted 
to lock the EOGB’s self-contained television camera onto the target’s contrast with its 
surroundings.  In optimal conditions, this process could take 5-10 seconds.  Over North Vietnam 
it could take up to 30 seconds depending on the ground haze, target contrast, and position of the 
sun.  Once lock on was achieved, the bomb was released and, provided there was no further 
interference, impacted its target.16
There were several limitations on USAF’s employment of these weapons.  First, the 
weather had to be fairly clear and relatively windless over the proposed target area.  Second, 
there had to be a minimal amount of smoke or dust in the vicinity of the structure to be 
destroyed.  In the case of LGBs, obscurants scattered the guidance laser and caused the weapon 
 93
to “go stupid” and follow a ballistic path.  EOGBs, on the other hand, had a tendency to lose 
their contrast unless light conditions remained ideal.  Finally, and most importantly, there had to 
be minimal interference from enemy defenses in the area.  The release parameters for both 
EOGBs and LGBs were in the heart of the SA-2’s envelope, and the F-4s carrying the large 
bombs could only carry out the SAM evasion maneuver with difficulty.  These problems grew 
even worse once the Phantoms entered the target area.  While the former were fire and forget 
weapons, the more accurate Paveways required target illumination throughout.  This illumination 
would be problematic if the designating aircraft was performing the SAM evasion maneuver.   
This was also true if the Pave Knife F-4 had to evade a determined MiG attack while designating, 
as the pod’s gimbal-mounted laser had specific g-limits that would prevent designating if 
exceeded.17   
Collectively, all of these factors greatly constrained how 7th Air Force could use its most 
effective weapons.  There were only six Pave Knife pods in 7th Air Force’s inventory at the start 
of the Linebacker operations.18  The only crews certified to use the Pave Knife pods were 
concentrated in a single unit (the 8th TFW).  Likewise, the 8th TFW was also the only unit whose 
backseaters were extensively trained in the use of the EOGB.  Seventh Air Force’s guided 
weapon capability, in other words, resided in a half-dozen pods, a little more than twenty F-4s, 
and the fifty or so men who manned them.  The fragility of this force was not lost on General 
Vogt and his staff, and they immediately set about determining methods to create the permissive 
air defense environment necessary.  It was at this point AFM 1-1’s lack of SEAD doctrine reared 
its head.  Rather than being able to refer to a common doctrine that established how to engage an 
IADS, 7th Air Force was left to find their own way to prevent destruction of 8th TFW aircraft.  
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The method General Vogt and his staff chose had three major components.  First was the 
use of “chaff bombers,” i.e., a fleet of F-4s equipped with droppable chaff dispensers.  When 
these containers opened, they spread radar reflective metal strips specifically manufactured to 
jam the Fan Song radar.  This “chaff corridor” then descended slowly and prevented North 
Vietnamese SA-2 sites from locking onto the following strike force.  Complementing this 
technique were direct attacks on North Vietnamese radars by Wild Weasel aircraft.  Finally, in 
order to counter the NVAF’s interceptors, several flights of F-4s served as MiG Combat Air 
Patrol (MiGCAP).19
In one way, this approach was successful—the Air Force lost only one Pave Knife to 
enemy action throughout the Linebacker operations and the overall loss rate was far lower than 
that of Rolling Thunder.20  Yet the inefficiency of 7th Air Force’s SEAD technique more than 
balanced the positives of lower casualties and preservation of capability.  From 30 March 
through 23 October, 1972 Seventh Air Force had to dispatch 4-8 sorties of support aircraft (Wild 
Weasels, jammers, chaff bombers, and escorts) for every F-4 actually delivering bombs to a 
target.21  In numerical terms, this meant that the NV-IADS forced 7th Air Force to forswear 4-8 
Phantoms’ worth of ordnance (typically 16,000-32,000 lbs. maximum) for every two to four 
LGBs (2,000-6,000 pounds maximum) delivered by an 8th TFW F-4.  Operationally, such effort 
meant USAF had enough aircraft to conduct interdiction missions or strikes against North 
Vietnamese infrastructure but seldom both.   
Strategically, this meant that 7th Air Force could not deliver enough consistent firepower 
against North Vietnam to shake its resolve.  It is true that targets which had resisted every effort 
to attack them in 1968 (e.g., the Paul Doumer and Than Hoa bridges) were destroyed to great 
psychological and material effect.22  Similarly, the precision weapons placed targets such as NV-
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IADS command posts at risk for the first time in the war.23  However, the effort required to 
accomplish these feats meant that 7th Air Force was unable to strike a great many others.  
Without doctrinal guidance that provided methodologies on how to dismantle an NV-IADS, 
Seventh Air Force had chosen a method that had denied air power its greatest strength: 
flexibility.  In turn, because the NV-IADS forced USAF to employ so much of its force in 
protecting the 8th TFW’s F-4s, 7th Air Force’s lower loss rate and ability to place all targets at 
risk was not fully realized.  By not being able to replicate the fury of Rolling Thunder, much less 
exceed it, USAF provided no incentive for the DRV’s leaders and populace to change their 
course of action.24   
Goal #3: Conventional Deterrence 
 
In addition to preventing the delivery of sufficient punishment, the amount of effort 
required for USAF to penetrate North Vietnamese air space called into question its conventional 
capabilities.  This was not a small matter given the primacy of USAF in many alliance and 
individual allies’ defense plans.  For example, United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) was 
considered to be the primary interdiction and deep strike organization for the entire NATO 
alliance.  Similarly, the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) was organized primarily towards 
close air support with the understanding that USAF would carry the bulk of interdiction and 
strike missions against North Korean forces should a second conflict erupt on the Korean 
peninsula.25  In these and other contingency examples, American allies expected that USAF 
would be able to achieve and exploit air superiority quickly and thus planned accordingly. 
USAF’s leaders recognized this reality as evidenced both by AFM 1-1’s 
acknowledgments of conventional operations and the war plans developed with allied nations.  
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However, thoughts and theories were one thing whereas 7th Air Force’s difficulties in striking 
Hanoi were quite another.  During Linebacker operations, the NV-IADS was able to force USAF 
to adopt measures that were only feasible due to the unique situation in Southeast Asia.  With 
bases in Thailand and the NVAF possessing only a feeble strike capability, 7th Air Force could 
take liberties with regard to its own defense.  This would not be the case in the majority of the 
contingencies that allied or national interest compelled the Air Force to plan for.  Similarly, the 
NV-IADS continued to use the obsolescent SA-2 rather than being equipped with the far more 
modern systems available to North Korea, the Warsaw Pact, or other potential American 
enemies.  Finally, although the NVAF’s MiGs operated in a favorable environment due to GCI 
and the existence of sanctuary, they also were not present in the numbers that USAF could 
expect to face in a likely Central European, Korean, or Middle East contingency.26   
Combined, these factors led to a lack of internal confidence in USAF’s conventional 
capability.  By the conclusion of Linebacker operations, Air Force pilots did not have faith in 
their ability to defeat modern Soviet-bloc air defense systems either singly or when these were 
part of an integrated whole.27   Indeed, the mere possibility that the North Vietnamese may have 
possessed the SA-3 Goa during 1972 caused many anxious moments both to 7th AF planners 
and, once the B-52s were committed, their SAC counterparts.28  Similarly, Air Force pilots had 
begun to doubt their ability to combat hostile interceptors in a major conflict.29  Finally, TAC’s 
and SAC’s own leaders came to believe that 7th Air Force’s performance indicated that USAF’s 
conventional capability was far beneath that which would be required to meet its conventional 
requirements.30   
This lack of internal faith clearly indicated a breakdown in conventional deterrence 
capability.  The President and Congress could not expect national policy to be executed by a 
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service that had lost faith in itself.  Moreover, the Air Force’s performance had left the United 
States’ civilian leaders questioning the service’s capability to carry out any of its missions.31  
Both of these outcomes, in light of the facts, were to be expected and stemmed from a lack of 
SEAD doctrine.  Had the Air Force’s leaders provided 7th Air Force guidance on how to destroy 
an integrated air defense system, there is a possibility that it could have done so and 
demonstrated American conventional capability.  However, as with the punishment objective, 
USAF’s doctrinal vacuum and subsequent ad hoc arrangement made this unfeasible.  The effort 
required to attack North Vietnam left the Air Force’s own pilots, America’s civilian leaders, and, 
more than likely, allies and enemies alike questioning USAF’s ability to project power against a 
hostile air defense system.  This undermined the Nixon doctrine and was hardly what the 
President expected from the Air Force’s efforts. 
Goal #4: Preserving the Manned Strategic Bomber Deterrent 
 
The inability of 7th Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on the North Vietnamese 
forced President Nixon to seek alternate means of persuasion.  Furthermore, he needed to 
convince South Vietnam’s President Thieu to trust American promises for long-term 
commitment.  With this in mind, President Nixon committed SAC’s B-52s against North 
Vietnam in December 1972.32  In his memoirs, Nixon indicates that he was well aware of the 
risks when he made this decision, but settled upon it with the expectation that the Air Force 
would be able to carry out his assault with little difficulty.33   
It is easy to understand why Nixon was so confident.  General LeMay, during his time as 
head of SAC, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and USAF Chief of Staff had made the 
Stratofortress into a symbol of American security.  Over two decades, the big Boeing bomber 
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had become to much of the American populace what the Royal Navy’s warships had been to the 
English people.34  To the Soviet Union, the B-52 was a system so fearful that it had elicited 
multiple weapons systems and the wholesale modernization of an entire military service whose 
sole purpose had been its destruction in wartime.35  In deploying the bomber that the Dictionary 
of Modern War described as “the mainstay of SAC’s bomber force,” Nixon not only intended to 
send the North Vietnamese a message but also demonstrate America’s power projection 
capabilities to the entire world.36
Had the Air Force had a unified SEAD doctrine, it is likely that this gambit would have 
worked.  Two raids against the North Vietnamese panhandle in April 1972 had demonstrated the 
B-52s’ ability to penetrate the NV-IADS with appropriate TAC and naval air support.  At that 
time, desiring to cut the NVA’s southernmost supply link, PACAF staff had conceived of and 
directed a comprehensive plan that limited the big bombers’ vulnerability to SAMs and NVAF 
fighters.  Even though the North Vietnamese defenders damaged one B-52, the shock effect on 
the NV-IADS and destruction of material made the mission a smashing success.37  Unfortunately 
for USAF, this planning had not been as a result of doctrine but that of a theater staff applying its 
experience and knowledge.  Furthermore, the raids in question had been small, sharp affairs 
involving fewer than twenty-five bombers.  These small attacks, in turn, did not require the 
length or breadth of defensive suppression that a much larger raid would require.  Finally, a raid 
in November 1972 had led to the loss of a B-52.  Ominously, the techniques used by the North 
Vietnamese to down this bomber indicated the NV-IADS had begun to adapt to both the B-52s’ 
internal ECM as well as tactical SEAD measures.38
Regardless of this loss’s implications, the Air Force’s leaders still believed that USAF 
could carry out the massive raids President Nixon desired.  Due to the size of the B-52 force, 
 99
SAC refused to delegate any authority for the operation to forces in the Pacific theater.  
Inexplicably, SAC’s staff did not consult either PACAF or 7th Air Force during the planning 
phase.  Instead, SAC’s commander, General John C. Meyer, with the full consent of General 
Ryan, used SAC’s staff to compose the operations orders for the initial strikes.39  These orders 
were then, in turn, passed down to a subordinate unit, the 8th Air Force.  Based in Omaha, the 
8th’s primary focus was preparing for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, but it had 
developed plans for striking against North Vietnam in April.40  SAC’s staff, ostensibly 
concerned with collateral damage, ignored this previous work and developed its own set of 
orders that it dictated to 8th Air Force.  SAC headquarters did not give 8th Air Force the option of 
modifying the directives, citing the subordinate headquarters’ involvement in the coordination of 
support assets and the sundry details inherent to such a massive undertaking.41
Given these facts as well as the internecine warfare that dominated the Air Force during 
this time period, it is debatable just how much influence SEAD doctrine would have had on the 
development of SAC’s plan.  However, it is clear that the lack of guidance strongly influenced 
both the planning and execution of operations conducted in support of the bombing raids.  Due to 
the choices made by 7th Air Force in the absence of SEAD doctrine, the NV-IADS had not 
suffered permanent degradation from April through December 1972.  On the contrary, emphasis 
on passive measures had allowed SAM operators and crews to gain in proficiency as well as 
develop countermeasures during the ensuing months.42  Similarly, despite the effect mining 
Haiphong and President Nixon’s diplomatic efforts had on retarding Soviet and Chinese 
resupply, 7th Air Force’s SEAD techniques had not resulted in a gradual attriting of Fan Song or 
early warning radars.43  Finally, instead of eliminating the NVAF’s MiGs, 7th Air Force’s 
Phantoms had once more been fought to a virtual draw.  Therefore, rather than concentrating on 
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using the tactical fighters to maximum effect, American staffs had to develop an escort plan that 
placed F-4s on MiGCAP.  Combined, these circumstances meant that SAC was, for all practical 
purposes, engaging the NV-IADS when the latter was both experienced and at peak strength. 
The resulting carnage not only came as an unpleasant shock to USAF but also signaled 
the shattering of the strategic triad’s manned bomber leg.  Fifteen B-52s were destroyed and ten 
more damaged during what the Air Force called Operation Linebacker II but participating SAC 
crews would dub “The Eleven Days of Christmas.”   Only the strenuous intervention of fighter 
bombers, naval gunfire support, changes in tactics, and electronic jamming aircraft prevented 
losses from being far worse.44  Contemporary Air Force monographs and papers attempted to 
sugarcoat the losses by pointing out that the majority of B-52s lost either had their electronic 
countermeasures improperly configured, flew poorly, or simply blundered into the path of 
volley-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).45   These statements, given SAC’s alleged strategic 
mission, were sophistry at best.  Regardless of the reason, the world had observed a second-tier 
military force equipped with obsolescent weapons inflict heavy losses on what was allegedly the 
premier Air Force in the world. 
It is not hard to surmise the effects this had on the manned bomber as a strategic 
deterrent.  From the American perspective, Linebacker II provided President Nixon with even 
more evidence that USAF could only function in ideal conditions.  In addition to being incensed 
by the casualties the losses represented, Nixon was concerned at what effect the loss of bombers 
had on the North Vietnamese.46  Given that the North Vietnamese dubbed the B-52 raids the 
“Dien Ben Phu” of the skies, President Nixon’s anxiety was quite justified.47  Just how 
unconcerned the North Vietnamese were about return visits from the B-52s can be seen by how 
quickly the NVA set about violating the 1973 Paris Accords.48  The fact that USAF no longer 
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deterred even North Vietnam speaks volumes to how greatly Linebacker II shattered the B-52s’ 
mystique.   
The United States primary strategic opponent, the Soviet Union, echoed this disdain for 
the bombers.  The first night’s situation (e.g., short warning time, prepared enemy defenses, and 
limited tactical fighter support) closely replicated that which would be in place during a nuclear 
war.  The U.S.S.R., as North Vietnam’s main arms supplier, was well aware of three things.  
First, the equipment of the North Vietnamese was far inferior to that of PVO Strany.  While 
Soviet doctrine dictated that military services retain obsolescent systems in order to maintain a 
defense in depth, faster, larger, and more sophisticated SAMs in the U.S.S.R. had long 
superseded the SA-2.  Second, the North Vietnamese had been able to inflict heavy losses on 
USAF without the full use of the NV-IADS due to a lack of pilots trained in night flying.  The 
Red Air Force on the other hand maintained at least a limited night capability with all of its 
interceptor squadrons.49  Finally, with the Soviet Union’s strategic depth serving to limit tactical 
fighter support, the majority of these elements would be able to operate without the interference 
of Wild Weasels or escorting fighters that proved so critical to limiting SAC’s losses after the 
first three days’ of bombing.50  Even with total losses far beneath those expected by SAC, 
Linebacker II all but finished the manned bomber as a nuclear deterrent as well.51
This erosion of the B-52s’ deterrent value was far from necessary and USAF’s response 
to the first three nights’ losses demonstrates this fact.  Stung by the strength of the NV-IADS, the 
Air Force quickly began to revise its tactics and operational focus.  First, both SAC and 7th Air 
Force began to consider the NV-IADS as an entire operational system, complete with supply 
lines and vulnerable points.  Second, after determining these vulnerable points, General Vogt and 
his staff began to place pressure against them.  Using all the weapons within their arsenal, SAC, 
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7th Air Force, PACAF, and the USN’s TF 77 began to strike at MiG airfields, SAM assembly 
sites and, in a couple of cases, SAM batteries that had displayed an above-average level of 
proficiency.  Finally, after the Christmas break SAC routed the B-52s in manner that facilitated 
7th Air Force’s defense suppression efforts.52   
Although it is hard to quantify the effects of these efforts or separate them from the other, 
non-SEAD countermeasures being conducted, the precipitous drop in SAM launches and number 
of B-52s destroyed indicates that they had a positive effect.  Whether a SEAD doctrine which 
directed these efforts at the start of Linebacker II would have lessened the losses and maintained 
the viability of the manned bomber remains an open question.  Regardless of one’s answer, 
however, the sharp decrease in losses strongly indicates that the Air Force’s initial problems 
stemmed from the lack of guidance.  It is hard to imagine a situation where a manual that laid out 
a proper SEAD doctrine prior to the start of Linebacker II would have been detrimental given 
these results.   
 Nadir 
 
Even with the improvements USAF had been able to cobble together at the conclusion of 
Linebacker II, that operation’s conclusion served as the nadir of USAF SEAD capability.  In 
response to North Vietnam’s overt aggression and attempt to destroy the South Vietnamese 
government by force, President Nixon had dispatched the Air Force to Southeast Asia with the 
intent of disrupting the North’s offensive, punishing the DRV’s leaders, proving USAF’s 
conventional capabilities, and maintaining the strategic deterrence value of the manned bomber 
fleet.  The Air Force’s only success had been the interdiction of North Vietnamese supply lines, 
and the inability to complete the other three objectives had been due to the improvised nature of 
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USAF’s SEAD efforts.  With a well-thought out doctrine that laid out the steps necessary to 
disrupt or destroy an enemy air defense, the Air Force may have had a chance to achieve its 
goals.  Without it, however, Air Force commanders were left to develop a plan that not only 
botched the suppression of the NV-IADS but also ensured that the North Vietnamese had little 
fear of future attacks.  In the end, rather than serving as a success, the Linebacker operations 
were a stunning defeat brought about by the Air Force’s military and civilian leaders’ decisions 
concerning SEAD doctrine development after Operation Rolling Thunder. 
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Appendix A - NV-IADS Illustrations 
 
 
Figure A.1 NVN AAA Weaponry1
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 Figure A.2 37mm AA Gun2
 
Figure A.3 57mm AA Gun3
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Figure A.4 85mm AA Gun4
 
 
 
Figure A.5 SA-2 Guideline missile.5
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Figure A.6 Typical NVN SA-2 Site.6
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Figure A.7 MiG-17 Fresco.7
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Figure A.8 MiG-17 Fresco.8
 
Figure A.9 MiG-19 Farmer.9
 132
 Figure A.10 MiG-21 Fishbed.10
 
                                                 
1  Pratt, x (chart follows page). 
 
2  DoD photo from author’s personal collection. 
 
3  Ibid.. 
 
4  Ibid.. 
 
5  Ibid.. 
 
6  Pratt, 2 (illustration follows page). 
 
7  DoD photo from author’s personal collection.  Note MiG’s size relative to crewmen. 
 
8  Author’s collection.  Note pickup trucks in background for scale. 
 
9  DoD photo from author’s personal collection. 
 
10  Ibid.. 
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Appendix B - USAF Illustrations 
 
 
Figure B.1 USAF / USN Route Packages1
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Figure B.2 F-4 Phantom with MiG-21.2
Figure B.3 F-105 in clean configuration.3
 135
Figure B.4 F-105 carrying full bombload.4
 
 
 
Figure B.5 F-105 Wild Weasel.5
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Figure B.6 Optimal Pod Formation.6
 137
Figure B.7 355th TFW (Tahkili Thunderchief Wing) Pod Formation.7
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Figure B.8 388th TFW (Korat Thunderchief Wing) Pod Formation.8
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 Figure B.9 General Dynamics F-111.9
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Figure B.10 Boeing B-52 Stratofortress.10
 
 
 141
 
Figure B.11 AGM-45 Shrike.11
 
 
Figure B.12 F-4 Wild Weasel Carrying Shrike (outboard), Maverick (mid-wing), and 
Standard (inboard) on external pylons.12
 142
 Figure B.13 AIM-9 Sidewinders (top row) and AIM-7 Sparrows (bottom row) being loaded 
on an F-4C.  Note crewman for scale.13
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Figure B.14 F-4C configured for multi-role mission.  This was the usual configuration for 
Phantoms tasked with an air-to-ground primary mission followed by a secondary air-to-air 
encounter.  This particular F-4C was Colonel Olds’ mount during Operation Bolo.14
                                                 
 
1  PACAF CHECO / CORONA HARVEST Division, The F-111 In Southeast Asia, September 1972 – 
January 1973, by A. A. Picinich, Col., USAF, et. al., Project CHECO Report, U.S. Air Force (Maxwell AFB, 21 
FEB 1974 (Declassified 16 January, 2000), 66. 
 
2  Author’s personal collection.  Note the F-4’s wings are folded, giving it the appearance of being smaller 
than it actually would be in flight.  This particular F-4, a ‘D’ model located at Topeka’s Combat Air Museum, 
destroyed a MiG-21 on October 12, 1972. 
 
3  Courtesy of the USAF Museum.  Note the crewmen standing next to another Thunderchief in order to get 
a general idea of the fighter’s great size.   
 
4  Courtesy of the USAF Museum.  As can be seen, external bombs and pylons broke up the F-105’s 
normally clean aerodynamic lines with resultant loss of speed and maneuverability. 
 
5 Courtesy of the USAF Museum.  Note the F-105 Wild Weasel’s two-seat arrangement.    
 
6 Pratt, 20 (figure follows page).    
 
7 Ibid..   
 
8 Ibid..   
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9 Courtesy of the USAF Museum.  Note external carriage of Paveway and Sidewinder weapons.  
 
10  Ibid.. 
 
11 Ibid..   
 
12 Ibid..  Note large size of Standard compared to Shrike.   
 
13 Courtesy Department of Defense.   
 
14  Courtesy USAF Museum. 
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Appendix C - Glossary of Terms 
TERM DEFINITION 
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AFM Air Force Manual 
AGM Air to Ground Missile 
AIM Air Intercept Missile 
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile 
BVR Beyond Visual Range 
DRV Democratic Republic Vietnam 
ECM Electronic Countermeasures 
EOGB Electro-optical Guided Bomb 
EWO Electronic Warfare Officer 
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept 
IADS Integrated Air Defense System 
LGB Laser Guided Bomb 
MiG Mikoyan Gurevich Design Bureau 
MiGCAP MiG Combat Air Patrol 
NVA North Vietnamese Army 
NVAF North Vietnamese Air Force 
PACAF Pacific Air Force 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
StARM Standard Anti-Radiation Missile / AGM-78
TAC Tactical Air Command 
TFW Tactical Fighter Wing 
USAF United States Air Force 
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